

THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY: TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this research is to determine if the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. In December of 1996, the Guatemalan government and the insurgent representatives signed the final Peace Accord that brought an end to the country's thirty-six years of civil war. Since then, the Guatemalan military has had four years in which to transition from war to peace and to fulfill the requirements of the Peace Accords. This study develops a set of criteria that indicate a successful transition from a counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military. Next, this study determines the disposition of the Guatemalan military prior to the declared peace, examines relevant requirements of the Peace Accords, determines the current disposition of the Guatemalan military, and then compares all three in order to establish whether or not the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. This study concludes by identifying what else the Guatemalan military must do in order to continue its transition and how the United States can support those efforts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ILLUSTRATIONS	v
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	13
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	21
4. ANALYSIS	25
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	96
REFERENCE LIST	110
BIBLIOGRAPHY	112
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	118

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Wartime Organization of the Guatemalan Military (as of 1996)	108
2. Peacetime Organization of the Guatemalan Military (as of 2000)	109

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

In December 1996, the Guatemalan government and insurgent representatives signed the final Peace Accord that brought an end to the country's thirty-six years of civil war. With the end of hostilities, the Guatemalan military needed to transition from wartime and counterinsurgency operations to peacetime and an external national defense focus. The new peace also called for the military to relinquish much of its control over government functions (which it had throughout most of the internal conflict) and to transition to a more professional military under civilian control within a democracy. The success of this transition greatly affects the well-being of Guatemala, its acceptance in the international community, and the United States' interaction with this Central American country. For that reason, whether the Guatemalan military has successfully made this transition or not is the subject of much debate.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the transition since 1996 of the Guatemalan military from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture. Specifically, the primary research question is to determine if the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. This transition can be divided into two parts to form secondary research questions. The first part of the transition concerns the internal structure of the military that dictates how the military will determine and prepare to perform its functions. If the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role, then it transitioned from counterinsurgency war to peace with an external defense focus. In

order for this to be true, the following events, which form tertiary questions for this thesis, must occur: (1) the Guatemalan military must change its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions; (2) the Guatemalan military must change its organization to support its new role and missions; and (3) the Guatemalan military must change its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations. The second part of the transition relates to the current condition of the military that indicates its level of professionalism and support to democracy. If the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy, then it transitioned to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. In order for this to be true, the following conditions, which form more tertiary questions for this thesis, must exist: (1) the Guatemalan military must have a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement; (2) the Guatemalan military must support the ideals of democracy and must profess respect for human rights; and (3) the Guatemalan military must recognize its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. The thirty-six years of civil war and its conclusion in December 1996 set the conditions for the Guatemalan military's transition from war to peace.

During the internal conflict the Guatemalan military fought an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, marked by several tactical successes. However, during that campaign, the Guatemalan military, as well as the insurgents, violated the human rights of combatants and noncombatants on a regular basis (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 22). Also, with the country in a state of civil war, the Guatemalan military took over several governmental functions, such as law enforcement and local

civic administration (Schirmer 1998, 25). But, with the signing of the Final Peace Accord on 29 December 1996, the country's civil war came to an end. The Final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, was the thirteenth accord in the United Nations mediated peace process that started back in January 1994 (Republic of Guatemala 1996c). With the end of hostilities, the Guatemalan military needed to transition from wartime to peacetime. This meant transitioning from counterinsurgency operations inside Guatemala's borders to peacetime operations with an external national defense focus. In fact, several of the Peace Accords, especially the eighth accord, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, required specific changes to the Guatemalan military structure as part of the peace agreement (Republic of Guatemala 1996a). Later, the Commission for Historical Clarification's report of conclusions and recommendations, *Guatemala Memory of Silence*, called for additional changes in the Guatemalan military in light of past human rights violations (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 60-65).

Since the Guatemalan military had been fighting guerrillas for the past thirty-six years, its doctrine, organizational structure, and training concepts were centered only on counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the transition from wartime to peacetime necessitated a change in Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training. Also, the new peace required the military to relinquish much of its control over governmental functions and transition to a more professional military. Giving up control of governmental functions is part of the overall Guatemalan government transformation necessary to address several concerns of the guerrillas, the Guatemalan people, and the international community. For the Guatemalan military to become more professional, it

also must address concerns over human rights violations, civilian control, and support to democracy. All these concerns are delineated in the United Nations mediated Peace Accords and the Commission for Historical Clarification report.

It has now been four years since the final Peace Accord was signed. During that time, a free and fair national election took place in 1999, followed by a smooth transition of power from one government administration to the next. The administration of President Alvaru Arzú Irigoyen of the National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)) oversaw the signing of the last seven United Nations mandated Peace Accords and the first three years of their implementation. In January 2000, President Alfonso Portillo Cabrera and his administration from the Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)) took power and continued to advance the peace process. Both administrations, along with the Guatemalan military leadership, have worked to implement the governmental and military changes directed by the Peace Accords and to address the concerns of the Guatemalan people and the international community. A large portion of the changes and concerns relates to the military's transition from wartime to peacetime.

Whether or not the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned from wartime to peacetime is the subject of much debate. With the more open society that has come with peace, Guatemalan politicians, activists, and media now publicly deliberate over Guatemala's transformation, to include that of its military. On 30 March 1998, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA)), an organization established to monitor the implementation of the Peace Accords, released a statement declaring that the provisions

of the Peace Accords had been fulfilled (Van Volkenburg n.d., 58). Despite this, MINUGUA continues to operate in Guatemala, indicating that not all the Peace Accord requirements may have come to pass.

Many more government, nongovernment, and private organizations closely monitor Guatemala's effort to transition from wartime to peacetime, to include the United States Embassy in Guatemala. All of these groups have vastly different views as to the status of the Guatemalan military's transition. Among these groups with differing opinions are several sections within the United States government and several human rights watch-groups based in the United States. All of them are deeply concerned over the United States' political, economic, and military interests in Guatemala, as well as throughout the rest of Latin America. Unfortunately, many of the differing opinions seem to be based on emotion and political convenience instead of facts and a measurable standard. Evaluating the Guatemalan military's progress against a set standard that will indicate whether or not the transition has been successful will greatly help to articulate the expectations of the United States, the international community, and other interested groups. The success of the Guatemalan military's transition from wartime to peacetime greatly affects the well-being of Guatemalans, Guatemala's acceptance in the international community, and the United States' varied interests in Latin America.

In order to facilitate research, certain assumptions are necessary. The first assumption is that the four years since the signing of the final Peace Accord is reasonably sufficient time for the Guatemalan military to have transitioned from wartime to peacetime. This amount of time is more than enough for the Guatemalan military to have at least initiated those specific changes specified in the primary, secondary, and tertiary

research questions. As indicated above, MINUGUA reported that the provisions of the Peace Accords have already been met (Van Volkenburg n.d., 58). Many of those provisions address the Guatemalan military transition from war to peace.

The second assumption is that any transitional changes initiated by the Guatemalan military are documented. Given the large number of international, governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations interested in the Guatemalan peace process, anything affecting that process has been observed and recorded. From the Guatemalan government, the United States government (through its embassy in Guatemala), the United Nations, and several nongovernment organizations, substantial information on the Guatemalan military transformation from war to peace is available. Therefore, any changes affecting the Guatemalan military were substantiated and included in this study.

The final assumption is that any specific changes initiated will eventually be institutionalized by the Guatemalan military and internalized by its members. This is not to say that sincerity and determination are assumed to exist at all levels of the military. On the contrary, analysis of the commitment to each change is a definite factor in determining wartime to peacetime transition success. It only means that proof of permanence over an extended amount of time is not possible. The amount of time needed to institutionalize change is debatable. However, the short time that has passed since the signing of the final Peace Accord is probably not long enough. This is especially true given that the transition reverses thirty-six years of learned behavior. Institutionalization and internalization of new ideas and concepts is a lengthy process that must be continually supported. But, the initiation of new ideas and concepts is substantial enough

to declare successful transition for the present and, therefore, for this study. Through peacetime engagement activities, the United States, as well as other government and nongovernment organizations, can assist Guatemala in the institutionalization and affirmation process.

There are certain terms that are fundamental to this thesis and must be clearly defined. As indicated in the primary and secondary research questions, “successful transition” from a wartime posture to peacetime posture requires two parts. The first part concerns the internal structure of the military and defines “successful transition” as modified doctrine, organization, and training that reflects the new peacetime role with an external defense focus. The second part relates to the current condition of the military and defines “successful transition” as a more professional peacetime military that is supportive of democracy and subordinate to civilian control.

Some terms within the definition of “successful transition” also require defining. “Peacetime roles” are defined as those functions and missions that support the new peace environment. The United States Southern Command’s 1999 Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement indicates that appropriate roles for professional security forces include combating transnational threats, responding to natural and man-made disasters, promoting regional security and stability, and countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats (U.S. Southern Command 1999, 2-8). Therefore, the roles of a military transitioning from counterinsurgency should no longer primarily concern internal security. Instead, the military’s new peacetime roles should focus on other challenges such as external threats to security, transnational crime, and humanitarian assistance.

“Professional military” is more difficult to define. Much has been written about military professionalism, yet a clear definition is hard to find. *Webster’s Dictionary* defines professional as “characterized by or conforming to the technical or ethical standards of a profession” and defines profession as “a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation” (*Webster’s New World Dictionary*, 3rd ed., 1988, s.v. “professional” and “profession”). Though accurate, these generic definitions are not precise enough to help determine what exactly is expected from a professional military. In 1990, as chief of staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono wrote,

A professional in the Army is a leader who is expert in the profession of arms, is responsible for soldiers and units, is committed to the defense of the nation and is bound by a strong ethical framework. (Vuono 1990, 3)

Even though General Vuono defines the individual military professional and not a professional military unit, his words highlight the link between military professionalism and ethical behavior. General Vuono’s definition also points out the key concept of service to nation. A definition of military professionalism can be derived from the United States Southern Command’s vision statement:

A community of democratic, stable and prosperous nations successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats; served by professional, modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for human rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses to challenges. (U.S. Southern Command 1999, 2)

This vision statement suggests that a professional military follows democratic principles, shows respect for human rights, and is subordinate to a civil authority. Therefore, drawing from the above ideas, a professional military is one that recognizes its

subordination to civilian authority, supports the ideals of democracy, respects human rights, and values service to nation over personal advancement.

Command and General Staff College Student Text 20-10, *Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis*, defines limitations of a proposed study as “weaknesses imposed by constraints or restrictions beyond your control as a researcher” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 2000, 19). The major limitation of this study is the relatively short amount of time that has passed since establishment of the peace that required the Guatemalan military to transition from war to peace. It is assumed that sufficient time has passed since the signing of the final Peace Accord to allow the Guatemalan military to initiate the necessary changes to transition. It is also assumed that implementation of those necessary changes is sufficient and permanence proved through the passage of some indeterminate amount of time is not required. However, not enough time has passed for scholars to have analyzed and published significant amounts of work on the Guatemalan military’s transition from war to peace. In order to overcome this limitation, much of the research is based on source documentation, and original analysis. Nevertheless, there are enough primary resources available to adequately produce a sound thesis.

Student Text 20-10 defines delimitations of a proposed study as “constraints that you impose on the scope or content of a study so that research will be feasible” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 2000, 19). Two delimitations are placed on this study. First, this thesis concerns the Guatemalan military’s transition from war to peace and not the whole Guatemalan government’s transition or the Guatemalan society’s transition. The government as a whole, along with each faction of society, must also

successfully transition if Guatemala is to have a lasting peace. Indeed, political, social, and economic conditions can directly influence the military's efforts to transition from war to peace. But, by restricting the study to only the military transition, it produces a manageable topic while focusing on those aspects that most concern the United States military. Second, the thesis concerns those characteristics of the military transition that can be readily observed and evaluated (such as doctrine, organization, training, and professionalism). The study does not measure institutionalization or internalization of those changed characteristics. Such attitudes take an extended, indeterminable amount of time to take hold, most likely more time than has since passed. Also, a sincere commitment to transition, fully supported from both inside and outside the military, will lead to eventual institutionalization and internalization. Therefore, this restriction also helps keep the topic manageable while maintaining focus on those aspects of the transition that are both significant and relevant.

Whether or not the Guatemalan military successfully transitions from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military directly affects United States diplomatic and military relations with Guatemala. Currently, Congress prohibits conventional military-to-military relations between the United States and Guatemala. This is based on alleged human rights violations by the Guatemalan military during the war (Van Volkenburg n.d., 56). However, with the new peace, a reexamination of the United States' relationship with Guatemala is in order. Supporting democracy and human rights abroad is part of the United States security strategy and clearly in the national interest (U.S. President 1999). Therefore, the United States must determine how

it will continue to support Guatemala's transition from war to peace and help the Guatemalan people build a more stable democratic society.

Part of that support can be in the way of assistance to the Guatemalan military as it continues to develop new peacetime roles and improve the professionalism of its force. This military assistance can be in the form of renewed military-to-military relations, reinstated conventional International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and new Foreign Military Finance (FMF) projects that will support the new peacetime roles, promote professionalism, and encourage institutionalization of the transition. However, the United States does not want to provide any military assistance until the Guatemalan military has taken the necessary first steps to transition on its own.

This is where the debate occurs: What exactly must the military do in order to transition from a counterinsurgency war to peace? What exactly does the military have to do in order to become more professional? How much must the Guatemalan military do on its own in order to show sincere resolve before the United States will begin to provide additional support? There are many differing opinions on the answers to these questions from sources both inside and outside the United States government. Many of those opinions are prejudiced by emotions or based on immeasurable subjective criteria. When human rights issues are added, the debate becomes very emotionally charged and politically dangerous.

The research questions for this thesis are designed to be an objective, disinterested set of criteria that determine if the Guatemalan military has taken the necessary steps to transition from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture. Research has determined if the Guatemalan military had successfully transitioned at this point in time or if there is more

that must be done. This will establish either support for a return to normalized military-to-military relations between the United States and Guatemala or show what Guatemala needs to specifically accomplish before the United States will again provide military assistance. Also, the questions as to whether a country's military has successfully transitioned from counterinsurgency to peace or whether a country's military has become sufficiently professional will continue to arise and affect United States diplomatic and military relations around the world. This thesis can be the basis for the development of a model or standard against which military transition and professionalism can be measured. Such a model or standard can significantly assist both the United States Department of State and United States Department of Defense in evaluating diplomatic and military relations with foreign countries and producing objective, consistent policy recommendations for political and military leaders.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are volumes of literature on the history of Guatemala and its thirty-six years of civil war. These works provide theories on the underlying causes of the war and give postulated solutions to the conflict and unrest. Many pieces focus on the Guatemalan military's involvement in the war and present critical reviews of the counterinsurgency. They evaluate the military's strategic, operational, and tactical actions and assess their effects on the eventual outcome of the conflict. These comprehensive and thorough references provide detailed background information and clearly indicate the initial disposition of the Guatemalan military before the final Peace Accord.

The most significant work in this area is *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* by Jennifer Schirmer. A social scientist, Ms. Schirmer is associated with Harvard University. Her book documents the Guatemalan military's counterinsurgency operations and control of the government during the civil war. Covering the entire conflict through the signing of the final Peace Accord, her work concentrates mainly on the events of the 1980s. During that time, the Guatemalan military executed an intense counterinsurgency campaign, exercised maximum control over the government, and committed grave human rights violations. Based on numerous interviews with influential, high-ranking Guatemalan military and government officials, Ms. Schirmer's study provides detailed and precise accounts of the military's role in the civil war. Focusing on the military itself, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* presents the most comprehensive representation of the Guatemalan

military's disposition prior to the signing of the final Peace Accord. Ms. Schirmer does, however, communicate a strong bias against United States involvement in Guatemala. Despite this, her work proved to be extremely informative and very relevant to this thesis.

An equally significant and relevant work is David Stoll's *Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala*. An anthropology professor at Middlebury College, Mr. Stoll has published several works on Latin America in general and Guatemala in particular. Using a specific rural region in the Guatemalan highlands as a case study, *Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala* examines indigenous Mayan involvement in the civil war. Based on interpretation of personal accounts, Mr. Stoll argues that local participation in the conflict was a reaction to being caught between two warring factions, the Guatemalan military and the guerrillas, and not on any popular support for revolution. In detailing the indigenous Mayan as a third party in the civil war, he also describes the posture of both the more determined leftist insurgents and the Guatemalan military. Applicable to this thesis is that insight into the attitude and character of the two main belligerents.

Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy by Victor Perera also examines the civil war's effects on indigenous Mayans. In his book, Mr. Perera, a Guatemalan scholar, studies the effects of the internal conflict on indigenous Mayans and other Guatemalans within each separate region of the country. In doing so, he also explores some of the major issues that surround civil war, such as human rights, indigenous rights, poverty, and religion. Based on personal interviews and personal experiences, *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy* provides comprehensive information on the people of Guatemala, the basic reasons for unrest within the country, and the effects of the civil

war on all segments of the population. While partly biased by his personal involvement in the subject, Mr. Perera's emotionally charged work presents the human side of the conflict that must be understood in order to fully understand the institutional changes mandated in the Peace Accords. For this reason, *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy* added an important perspective.

Another useful reference is *Names, Dates and Places Relating to Guatemala since the Beginning of Time* by David Van Valkenburg. The political counselor at the United States Embassy in Guatemala since 1997, Mr. Van Valkenburg put together a thorough chronicle of the significant events in Guatemalan history. This unpublished work only has brief summaries of each historic event. However, it does highlight important names and dates that are sometimes difficult to locate in other works.

In 1998, Carlos G. Berrios, a United States Army Foreign Area Officer, published a thesis through the Naval Post Graduate School titled "Civil-Military Relations and Democratization in Guatemala." Captain Berrios' work focuses on the political relationship between Guatemala's civilian national government and the military leadership throughout the internal conflict and into the first few years of peace. His thesis does not cover the last three years of critical events and information relating to changes in the Guatemalan government and military. Nevertheless, his paper helped identify some different sources for research.

While there are numerous studies on Guatemala's civil war, not enough time has passed since the signing of the final Peace Accord for scholars to have analyzed and published significant amounts of work on the Guatemalan military's actual transition process. Therefore, most of the information available on the current situation in

Guatemala is in the form of primary source documentation. Official reports from governmental and nongovernmental organizations at the international and national levels help determine the current state of the Guatemalan military's transition from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture.

The actual Peace Accords describe exactly what is expected from all concerned parties, to include the Guatemalan military, in order to bring about a lasting peace. Mediated by the United Nations, the Peace Accords consist of thirteen separate agreements signed by representatives from the government of Guatemala and the unified insurgent organization, the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca). These separate agreements are as follows:

Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process Between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca signed 10 January 1994, *Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights* signed 29 March 1994, *Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala* signed 29 March 1994, *Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict* signed 17 June 1994, *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer* signed 23 June 1994, *Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples* signed 31 March 1995, *Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation* signed 6 May 1996, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* signed 19 September 1996, *Agreement on the Definitive Cease Fire* signed 4 December 1996, *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime* signed 7 December 1996,

Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca signed 12 December 1996, *Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements* signed 29 December 1996, and the final accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace* signed 29 December 1996.

Most of these accords address the Guatemalan military's role in the transition process; however, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* mandates specific changes in the Guatemalan military that are meant to support democracy and peace. These required changes in the military also correspond with the transition criteria put forth in this thesis. This serves to validate the credibility and applicability of chosen criteria.

The Peace Accords' *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer* resulted in formation of the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala. After years of research, the commission published *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations* on 25 February 1999. That report summarized the civil war human rights violations, assigned responsibility for those atrocities, and recommended several governmental and societal changes meant to forever remove the permissive atmosphere that had allowed those human rights atrocities to take place. Having found the Guatemalan government responsible for more than 80 percent of the civil war's human rights violations, the commission's eighty-four recommendations centered on changes the government needed to make. Many of those changes concern the Guatemalan military. While more specific than the Peace Accords'

recommendations, the Commission for Historical Clarification's recommendations are also compatible with the transition criteria in this thesis.

Much like the Commission for Historical Clarification, the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala conducted a separate investigation into the human rights violations of the civil war called the Recovery of Historical Memory Project. The results of that independent investigation appeared in a report published in 1999 called *Guatemala, Never Again*. Based on more than 5,000 interviews with victims and using statistical analysis, the report gives an accurate account of civil war and the human rights atrocities that occurred during the internal conflict. The report also includes recommendations for social reconstruction. Like the Commission for Historical Clarification report, many of the recommendations are for specific changes in the Guatemalan military to improve respect for human rights. Though slightly different, the recommendations in *Guatemala, Never Again* are in line with those in the Commission for Historical Clarification report.

Documents from the Guatemalan military are especially significant because they indicate the current state of the actual transition from a counterinsurgency military to a more professional peacetime military. Produced by the Guatemalan Minister of Defense in 1999, *Doctrina del Ejercito de Guatemala* (Guatemalan Army Doctrine) is the latest version of the Guatemalan military's cornerstone document. It declares the mission and purpose of the military and describes how the military will organize, train, and employ for operations. This document is the principal source for determining the current status of the Guatemalan military.

Another publication from the Guatemalan Minister of Defense is *Plan de Modernizacion 2005* (2005 Modernization Plan). This is the military's vision statement. It provides direction by indicating current modernization efforts that will guide the military through 2005. Among other things, it describes recent accomplishments and future objectives in the areas of Peace Accords compliance. This portion is particularly relevant to this thesis because it establishes what wartime to peacetime transition elements are complete and what transition elements are planned for the future.

The Guatemalan military also produces various annual reports that equate to posture statements. The reports *365 Dias al Servicio de la Paz*, released in 1998, *365 Dias al Servicio de la Patria*, released in 1999, and *Memoria de Labores, 365 Dias al Servicio de la Patria*, released in 1999, describe the current mission and disposition of subordinate commands and review recent significant operations, training, and special events. These reports reveal how the new concepts in the two Minister of Defense documents are being applied in the Guatemalan military.

The above sources contributed significantly to the research for this thesis. The bibliography lists these sources and several other works that relate to Guatemala's civil war and the transition from war to peace. While not dealing specifically with the Guatemalan military or the Guatemalan peace process, many of these works provide detailed accounts of the civil war along with its related human rights and indigenous rights issues. Other works present theories on the causes and effects of Guatemala's internal conflict as well as insurgency warfare throughout Latin America. All sources listed in the bibliography are unclassified and available to the public. However, some are only in Spanish and some may be hard to find outside of Guatemala. The published

materials are readily available through libraries and research institutes. Most of the official documents, to include the Peace Accords, are available on-line through the Internet. A few works, such as Guatemalan military publications, may be hard to obtain other than directly from the responsible institution or author.

Finally, the author provides a great deal of personal knowledge on the people, politics, and military of Guatemala. From August 1998 to June 2000, he served as the joint operations officer, United States Military Group, United States Embassy, Guatemala. As a member of the Security Assistance Office and the Country Team, he was able to observe first-hand as the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan military worked through the transition from wartime to peacetime and implementation of the Peace Accords. He was able to interact with government, military, and private sector leaders from both Guatemala and the United States who have a vested interest in a successful transition. The author applies his specific knowledge and personal experience to this thesis.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the transition since 1996 of the Guatemalan military from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture. Specifically, the primary research question is to determine if the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy.

This transition can be divided into two parts to form secondary research questions. The first part of the transition concerns the internal structure of the military that dictates how the military will determine and prepare to perform its functions. If the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role, then it transitioned from counterinsurgency war to peace with an external defense focus. In order for this to be true, the following events, which form tertiary questions for this thesis, must occur: (1) the Guatemalan military must change its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions; (2) the Guatemalan military must change its organization to support its new role and missions; and (3) the Guatemalan military must change its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations.

The second part of the transition relates to the current condition of the military that indicates its level of professionalism and support to democracy. If the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy, then it transitioned to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy.

In order for this to be true, the following conditions, which form more tertiary questions for this thesis, must exist: (1) the Guatemalan military must have a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement; (2) the Guatemalan military must support the ideals of democracy and must profess respect for human rights; and (3) the Guatemalan military must recognize its subordination to a civilian democratic authority.

Therefore, the six tertiary questions become the basis for research in order to determine if the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. The research methodology used to determine the disposition of the six questions consisted of four phases.

The first phase of research determined the disposition of the Guatemalan military prior to the Peace Accords. Research of secondary sources on Guatemala and its thirty-six years of civil war developed the background for this thesis, firmly set the initial disposition of the Guatemalan military prior to the Final Peace Accord, and established the need to transition from wartime to peacetime. This phase set a baseline for each of the six measures of the Guatemalan military before any transition from a wartime posture to peacetime posture was necessary.

The second phase of research determined the specific transition requirements placed on the Guatemalan military as a result of the declaration of peace. Research of primary sources, specifically the thirteen separate agreements of the Peace Accords, the Commission for Historical Clarification reports, and the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala report, determined what specified changes were expected in

the Guatemalan military as a result of peace. This phase helped validate the tertiary research questions, refine the stated definitions of “peacetime roles” and “professional military,” and direct the next phase of research. In addition, this research established the relationship between the research questions of this thesis and the military conditions stipulated in the Peace Accords.

The third phase of research determined the current disposition of the Guatemalan military. Research of primary sources, especially Guatemalan military official publications, United Nations reports, and United States Embassy in Guatemala reports, established the current state of the Guatemalan military in reference to the six tertiary research questions. The author’s first-hand experience in working peacetime transition issues while serving as the United States Military Group joint operations officer as part of the United States Embassy in Guatemala over the past two years also assisted greatly in determining and analyzing the current status of the Guatemalan military. This phase resolved how much progress the Guatemalan military made in reference of the six transition measures since the signing of the final Peace Accord in 1996.

The fourth and final phase of research compared the disposition of the Guatemalan military prior to the Peace Accords with the current disposition of the Guatemalan military in reference to the specific transition requirements placed on the Guatemalan military. This evaluation focused on the six tertiary questions in order to determine if the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role and whether the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy.

The four phases of this research methodology accomplished the purpose of this thesis and determined whether or not the Guatemalan military has successfully transitioned from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. The research answered the primary research question and also revealed how far along the Guatemalan military was in the transition process reference to the six measures established by the tertiary research questions. This illustrated what more the Guatemalan military must do in order to continue its conversion from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture and support a lasting peace. This also showed where the United States might be able to actively support the institutionalization of a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

On 29 December 1996, the Guatemalan government and insurgent representatives signed the thirteenth and final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, of the United Nations mediated peace process that brought an end to the country's thirty-six years of civil war (Republic of Guatemala 1996c). During the internal conflict the Guatemalan military fought an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, marked by numerous tactical successes. In fact, by the 1980s the Guatemalan government had developed the most efficient rural counterinsurgency program ever conducted in Latin America (Simon 1987, 14). However, during that campaign, the Guatemalan military, as well as the insurgents, violated the human rights of combatants and noncombatants on a regular basis (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 22). Also, with the country in a state of civil war, the Guatemalan military took over several governmental functions, such as law enforcement and local civic administration (Schirmer 1998, 25).

With the end of hostilities, the Guatemalan military needed to transition from wartime to peacetime. This meant transitioning from counterinsurgency operations inside Guatemala's borders to peacetime operations with an external national defense focus. It also meant relinquishing control over government functions and transitioning to a more professional military under civilian control within a democracy. In fact, several of the Peace Accords, especially the eighth accord, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, required specific changes to the Guatemalan military structure as part of the peace agreement

(Republic of Guatemala 1996a). Later, the Commission for Historical Clarification's report of conclusions and recommendations, *Guatemala Memory of Silence*, called for additional changes in the Guatemalan military in light of past human rights violations (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 60-65). In other words, the Guatemalan military had to make a successful transition from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. This transition can be divided into two parts.

The first part of the transition concerns the internal structure of the military that dictates how the military will determine and prepare to perform its functions. If the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role, then it has transitioned from counterinsurgency war to peace with an external defense focus. In order for this to be true, the following events must occur: The Guatemalan military must change its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions; the Guatemalan military must change its organization to support its new role and missions; and the Guatemalan military must change its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations.

The second part of the transition relates to the current condition of the military that indicates its level of professionalism and support to democracy. If the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy, then it has transitioned to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. In order for this to be true, the following conditions must exist: The Guatemalan military must have a professional officer corps that values service to nation

over personal advancement; the Guatemalan military must support the ideals of democracy and must profess respect for human rights; and the Guatemalan military must recognize its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. The thirty-six years of civil war and its conclusion in December 1996 set the conditions for the Guatemalan military's transition from war to peace.

It has now been four years since that final Peace Accord was signed. During that time, a free and fair national election took place in December 1999, followed by a smooth transition of power from one government administration to the next in January 2000. Both administrations, along with the Guatemalan military leadership, have worked to implement the governmental and military changes directed by the Peace Accords and to address the concerns of the Guatemalan people and the international community. These four years since the signing of the final Peace Accord is reasonably sufficient time for the Guatemalan military to have at least initiated all those specific changes previously specified.

The following evaluation separately focuses on each one of the specified transition criteria in order to determine if the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role and whether the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy. First, the evaluation will confirm the disposition of the Guatemalan military prior to the Peace Accords in reference to a specified set of criteria. This will firmly set the initial character of the Guatemalan military prior to the requirement to transition from wartime to peacetime. Next, the evaluation will clarify the specific transition requirements placed on the Guatemalan military, as a result of the declaration of peace, in reference to the

specified criterion. This establishes a logical relationship between the criterion and the military conditions stipulated in the Peace Accords, the Commission for Historical Clarification reports, and the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala report that are meant to ensure a lasting peace. Finally, the evaluation will establish the current disposition of the Guatemalan military in reference to the specified criterion. This determines the amount of progress the Guatemalan military made in its transition from wartime to peacetime since the signing of the final Peace Accord in 1996.

The Internal Structure of the Guatemalan Military

Since the Guatemalan military had been fighting guerrillas for the past thirty-six years, its doctrine, organizational structure, and training concepts were centered only on counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the transition from wartime to peacetime necessitated a change in Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training. The first part of the transition has to do with the internal structure of the military that dictates how the military will determine missions and prepare to perform its functions. If the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role, then it transitioned from counterinsurgency war to peace with an external defense focus. In order for this to be true, the following events must occur: The Guatemalan military must change its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions; it must change its organization to support its new role and missions; and it must change its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations. The following is

an evaluation of each one of these events in order to determine if they have, in fact, come to pass.

Doctrine

The United States Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines doctrine as

“fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” (U.S. Department of Defense 2000, 145).

Throughout the thirty-six years of civil war, the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan military developed counterinsurgency doctrine in order to bring about the defeat of insurgent groups and achieve its national objectives. Guatemala’s permanent national objectives, as published by the government in 1982, have always been:

- To maintain independence and total sovereignty
- To maintain territorial integrity
- To optimize general social well-being
- Institutional stability
- Economic development of the country
- More equiminious distribution of wealth (Schirmer 1998, 284)

In addition, external influences, internal politics, and evolving counterinsurgency theories affected the development of Guatemala’s counterinsurgency doctrine throughout the conflict.

In the beginning, the country’s counterinsurgency operations were more reactionary in nature and based on the unilateral decisions of the president. At that time, counterinsurgency doctrine was poorly defined and lacked direction. In the 1950s and 1960s, some Guatemalan military officers received irregular warfare training from the United States that affected their views on counterinsurgency warfare (Schirmer 1998,

15). In fact, differing views on counterinsurgency put younger officers at odds with more senior military and government officials and led to various coup attempts (Schirmer 1998, 15).

As Guatemalan government leaders changed (usually from one military general or colonel to another), the Guatemalan military's political influence increased, ideas on the conduct of the war evolved, and counterinsurgency doctrine developed. In the 1960s and 1970s, government and military leaders moved to increase the political power, economic influence, and governmental control of the Guatemalan military in the name of the counterinsurgency struggle (Schirmer 1998, 17). This led to almost complete military control of all governmental functions and, consequently, an increased involvement of all governmental agencies in the war effort. Not only did the military's doctrine revolve around counterinsurgency, but the entire Guatemalan government (usually under the direct control of the military) also focused on defeating the insurgents.

In the 1980s, Guatemalan military counterinsurgency doctrine evolved into a series of sophisticated, comprehensive plans based on prevailing counterinsurgency theory. Given that the Guatemalan military exercised ever-increasing control over the entire government, these counterinsurgency plans, while attributable to the Guatemalan government, were mainly military operations and, therefore, constituted military counterinsurgency doctrine. Known as National Security Doctrine, the country's existing counterinsurgency strategy saw the internal conflict as total polarization of the population (Schirmer 1998, 23). This view of population polarization led to planned military targeting of entire sectors of the population through offensive action. In particular, the

Mayan peasants of the Central Highlands, where the insurgent guerrillas traditionally maintained strongholds, became the central focus of counterinsurgency operations.

In 1982, within the National Security Doctrine, Guatemalan counterinsurgency doctrine became one of “pacification and reconciliation” where the military expended 70 percent of its effort on winning over war refugees through development projects (“Beans”) and 30 percent of the effort for repressive measures (“Bullets”) against those the army viewed as “lost” (Schirmer 1998, 23). In support of the national objectives, the counterinsurgency doctrine of pacification and reconciliation was the basis for several annual campaign plans that called on the vast majority of Guatemala’s political and military resources and directed them all toward the war effort.

Two major campaign plans, Plan Victory ’82 and Plan Stabilization ’84, introduced advanced counterinsurgency strategies that included civic action programs, psychological indoctrination, civic defense patrols, and model villages (Perera 1993, 107). Plan Victory ’82 included ad hoc military trials that convicted hundreds of common criminals and guerrillas and implemented a scorched-earth policy that destroyed 440 villages (Perera 1993, 87). Operation Ixil, the cornerstone of Plan Victory ’82, was designed to destroy the support bases for two separate guerrilla organizations in the Highlands and bring four million Mayas living in the area under direct military control (Perera 1993, 62). Plan Firmness ’83 set out to restructure the cultural, economic, and settlement patterns of the Highlands and strengthen the military’s presence (Schirmer 1998, 65). Within all of the campaign plans, population control followed a typical counterinsurgency scheme of closely watched, concentrated resettlements (Stoll 1993a, 5). Using two-thirds of the available military force, these counterinsurgency offensives

targeted the civilian population in order to dismantle the guerrilla support base, claimed tens of thousands of lives, and eventually forced a retreat of insurgent forces (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 229). These campaign plans exemplify the Guatemalan military counterinsurgency doctrine that closely resembled the scorched earth, strategic hamlets, and civil guards tactics of the United States in Vietnam (Simon 1987, 14). Though application of the pacification and reconciliation strategy resulted in many atrocities and may have, in fact, had the opposite effect than intended in relation to the national objectives, the corresponding annual campaign plans definitely illustrate a detailed and comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine.

In 1986, the Guatemalan government abandoned its National Security Doctrine for the new National Stability Doctrine as the basis for its counterinsurgency strategy. The National Stability Doctrine defined the army as “guarantor of the survival of the State” and “maintaining security as the foundation of national stability” (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 253). In support of this new national doctrine, the Thesis of National Stability, published in 1989, argued that activities outside the law are a threat to national security and the military must aggressively confront those activities that it sees as illegal in order to maintain national stability (Schirmer 1998, 138). This new National Stability Doctrine was really nothing more than a justification for the government’s repressive, often illegal, intelligence and security activities. However, the basic military counterinsurgency doctrine of pacification and reconciliation was still the basis for annual campaign plans with new emphasis on consolidating recent military gains, controlling the peasant population, and collecting intelligence on suspected subversives.

The Year-End Offensive of 1986 gathered up the remaining population in those areas of the Ixil region with a strong guerrilla presence (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 251). The next campaign plan, Plan Unity '88, worked to transform military advantage into political advantage and impede guerrilla contact with the civilian population by defending newly established advanced posts and controlling the displaced population throughout the countryside (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 254). A subsequent campaign plan, Plan Advance '90, included what is known today as information operations to “counteract internal and external ‘disinformation’ campaigns” that accused the military of wartime atrocities and human rights violations (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 260). Again, these campaign plans demonstrate a robust counterinsurgency doctrine that required the majority of the military’s resources to execute.

In the 1990s, while continuing to achieve tactical victories over the insurgents in the field, the Guatemalan military began to lose political power and influence due to increased external scrutiny of alleged human rights atrocities in the conduct of the war and some economic growth. In 1982, the four major insurgent organizations, the Guerilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP)), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (Organización del Pueblo en Armas (OPRA)), the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR)) and the Guatemalan Workers Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores (PGT)) had consolidated under one organization, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)) (Perera 1993, 10). In the 1990s, while continuing to lose in the field, the URNG began to realize that the external scrutiny of the Guatemalan

government's execution of the war and the military's eroding political influence created the conditions for political legitimacy. Though its call for the surrender of all guerrillas was unacceptable to the insurgent leaders, the Comprehensive Peace Plan '90 recognized the URNG as a legitimate counterpart in peace negotiations (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 265). Preparing for the inevitable, the Guatemalan military officer corps began to split into two sectors; one fighting the war and one preparing for peace negotiations (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 272).

However, that part of the Guatemalan military responsible for fighting the war continued to execute effective military campaigns based on their counterinsurgency doctrine. In 1992, the military returned to offensive operations in order to force the continued deterioration of the insurgent's combat power. One of the final campaign plans, Plan Victoria '93, aimed at destabilizing the guerrilla combat units, damaging the command structure, and obtaining strategic information (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 266). Even up to the end of the internal conflict in 1996, Guatemalan military doctrine was based on a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at achieving the national objectives of internal security and stability.

Throughout the thirty-six years of civil war, the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan military developed counterinsurgency doctrine in order to bring about the defeat of insurgent groups and achieve the permanent national objectives. First as part of the country's National Security Doctrine and then as part of its National Stability Doctrine, the Guatemalan military followed a counterinsurgency doctrine of pacification and reconciliation that incorporated many recognized counterinsurgency tactics and techniques. In support of the national objectives, the counterinsurgency doctrine of

pacification and reconciliation was the basis for several annual campaign plans that called on the vast majority of Guatemala's political and military resources and directed them toward the counterinsurgency effort. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any military doctrine other than counterinsurgency doctrine existed in Guatemala during the internal conflict. Also, the Guatemalan military's abuse of power during this time frame in order to seize control of government functions, gain political power, and excuse grievous atrocities against the population does not detract from the fact that the military felt they were prosecuting a war and followed counterinsurgency doctrine in doing so. Throughout the civil war, the Guatemalan military developed and applied a detailed and comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine.

With the signing of the final Peace Accord on 29 December 1996, Guatemala ended its civil war and began a process of reconstruction and reconciliation. That final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, incorporated all of the previously agreed upon Peace Accords and mandated compliance by stating:

With the exception of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, which has been in force since it was signed, all the agreements incorporated into the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace shall enter into force formally and in full when the present Agreement is signed. (Republic of Guatemala 1996c, 4-5)

Within those Peace Accords are several required reforms that directly affect the Guatemalan military. *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, signed in Mexico City on 19 September 1996, and *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime*, signed in Stockholm on 7 December 1996, particularly address military related reforms necessary for the Guatemalan government to be in compliance with the Peace Accords.

Furthermore, several of those required reforms deal with the purpose and doctrine of the Guatemalan military.

The Peace Accords clarify the purpose of the Guatemalan military following the end of the war. *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, explicitly states:

The role of the Guatemalan armed forces is defined as that of defending Guatemala's sovereignty and territorial integrity; they shall have no other functions assigned to them, and their participation in other fields shall be limited to cooperative activities. The measures laid down in this Agreement ensure that the doctrine, means, resources and deployment of the armed forces are in line with their functions and Guatemala's development priorities. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 12)

This definition restricts the Guatemalan military to only external defense functions with possibly some limited support activities. *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime* reinforces this restricted role of the Guatemalan military by directing an amendment to Article 244, *Constitution, Organization, and Functions of the Armed Forces*, of the Guatemalan Constitution to read:

The Guatemalan armed forces are a permanent institution in the service of the nation. They are unique and indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical, obedient and non-deliberative. Their function is to defend the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of its territory. They consist of land, sea and air forces. Their organization is hierarchical and is based on the principles of discipline and obedience. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 7)

When or how this amendment is actually adopted is beside the point. The fact is that these two portions of the Peace Accords indicate that the Guatemalan military must now develop and implement a new doctrine based on external defense and not on counterinsurgency. Moreover, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* expressly directs that:

A new military doctrine shall be formulated in accordance with the reforms envisaged in this Agreement. The doctrine shall encompass respect for the Guatemalan Constitution, human rights, the international instruments ratified by Guatemala in the military field, protection of national sovereignty and independence, the territorial integrity of Guatemala and the spirit of the agreements on a firm and lasting peace. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 13)

This indicates that the new Guatemalan military doctrine must be one of external defense in order to protect the country's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. By not listing any other roles, such as internal security, the new doctrine should not include any other major functions. As mentioned earlier, any other military functions would be in a limited support role. To clarify this point, *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime* dictates an additional Constitutional amendment to Article 183 that states:

Where the normal means for the maintenance of public order and internal peace have been exhausted, the President of the Republic may, on an exceptional basis, use the armed forces for this purpose. The action of the armed forces shall always be temporary, shall be conducted under civilian authority and shall involve no limitation whatsoever on the exercise of the constitutional rights of citizens. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 7)

While recognizing that rare cases of national emergency may require military augmentation of national police forces, this Constitutional amendment ensures that such cases are limited in scope and duration, carried out under positive control of civilian authorities, and accomplished without violation of constitutional rights. With such controls and limitations, this support mission should be a small part of the new military doctrine and definitely subordinated to the main function of external defense.

The fifth Peace Accord, *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer*, established the Commission for Historical Clarification

in Guatemala in order to investigate wartime atrocities and make recommendations to prevent future human rights violations. After years of research, the commission published *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations* on 25 February 1999. In that report, the commission concluded that the military's application of counterinsurgency doctrine led to the violation of civil rights and, therefore, recommended changes to Guatemalan military doctrine:

That the Government promote a new military doctrine for the Guatemalan Army, that should result from a process of internal reflection and consultation with the organizations of civil society. This doctrine should establish the basic principles for the appropriate relationship between the Army and society within a democratic and pluralist framework. Among these fundamental principles, at least the following should figure: a) The function of the Army is the defense of the sovereignty and independence of the State and the integrity of its territory. Its organization is hierarchical and based on the principles of discipline and obedience within the law. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 61)

In line with the Peace Accords, the Commission for Historical Clarification believes that Guatemalan military doctrine should be one of external defense and not one of internal security.

An external defense doctrine focuses on the preservation of the country's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. However, there are other appropriate peacetime roles a military may undertake as part of an external defense doctrine.

"Peacetime roles" are defined as those functions and missions that support the new peace environment. The United States Southern Command's 1999 *Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement* indicates that appropriate roles for professional security forces include combatting transnational threats, responding to natural and man-made disasters, promoting regional security and stability, and countering illicit drug activities

and other transnational threats (U.S. Southern Command 1999, 2-8). Therefore, the roles of a military transitioning from counterinsurgency should no longer primarily concern internal security. Instead, the military's new peacetime roles should focus on other challenges, such as external threats to security, regional stability, transnational crime, and humanitarian assistance.

With the new peace, the Guatemalan military obviously no longer faced an insurgent threat and, consequently, no longer needed a doctrine based on counterinsurgency. In addition, the Peace Accords specifically address the purpose of the Guatemalan military and direct that the Guatemalan military develop a new doctrine based on external defense with some limited support activities. The Commission for Historical Clarification's final report also recommends a new military doctrine focused on external defense in order to preclude future civil rights violations associated with internal security operations. A new external defense doctrine should provide for the protection of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. However, an appropriate external defense doctrine may also address other peacetime roles and limited support activities, such as promoting regional stability, combatting transnational crime, and providing humanitarian assistance.

The new peacetime environment and the Peace Accords required the Guatemalan military to change its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on external defense with suitable peacetime roles. Along with other mandated changes, the Guatemalan military began to work on a new doctrine soon after the signing of the final Peace Accord. In June 1999, the Guatemalan military published *Memoria de Labores, 365 Dias al Servicio de la Patria*, a report that describes the military's current posture, its

major accomplishments for the year, and its current state of compliance with the Peace Accords. That report indicates that work on a new Guatemalan military doctrine began in March 1997 (Ejército de Guatemala 1999b, 16). The report also states that, at the time of publication, a new doctrine in line with the Peace Accords was complete and awaiting final revisions (Ejército de Guatemala 1999b, 3).

In December 1999, the Guatemalan minister of defense published the final version of a new Guatemalan military doctrine based on external defense. *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* (Guatemalan Army Doctrine) is the latest version of the Guatemalan military's cornerstone document. It declares the mission and purpose of the military and describes how the military will organize, train, and deploy for operations. *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* begins with a purpose statement that directly addresses those doctrinal changes required by the Peace Accords by stating that this doctrine is in line with the Constitution and the spirit of the final Peace Accord (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, ii). Both President of the Republic Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen and Minister of Defense Marco Tulio Espinosa Contreras echo this exact sentiment in their two presentation letters that accompany the doctrine publication (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999). In fact, a thorough reading of *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* confirms that this new doctrine is based on external defense and in agreement with the Peace Accords.

In accordance with *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime*, and *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the new Guatemalan

military doctrine lists several doctrinal principles and values, to include: the function of the military as the defender of the sovereignty and independence of the country and the integrity of its territory; the hierarchical organization of the military based on the principles of discipline and obedience within the law; the military's respect for the Guatemalan Constitution, human rights, and the spirit of the Peace Accords; the military as professional, apolitical, obedient and non-deliberative (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 7-8). Furthermore, these themes are consistent throughout *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* that establishes external defense through protection of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity as the new military doctrine.

However, Guatemala has yet to make those constitutional amendments required by the Peace Accords. The legislative branch of the Guatemalan government is responsible for amending the Constitution and the Guatemalan military has no influence in the matter. In May 1999, a nationwide referendum on constitutional reforms recommended by the Peace Accords failed to pass. Although the referendum was open and fair, the consolidation of some fifty-two amendments under one yes or no vote caused some confusion and consternation that caused the voters to reject the reform package. Consequently, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* quotes the original Constitution Articles 183 and 244 as its functional justification. Nevertheless, the new doctrine purposely follows the recommendations of the Peace Accords so that, if the constitutional reforms pass, a simple replacement of the quoted articles will ensure doctrine conforms to both the Constitution and the Peace Accords.

In addressing internal security, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* explicitly states that such a support operation will be on an exceptional basis, temporary in nature,

and under the control of a responsible civilian authority (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 47). The new doctrine goes on to list examples of internal security support operations as public safety cooperation, immigration control cooperation, counternarcotics operations, forestry cooperation, and assistance for natural disaster relief (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 47). *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* never mentions counterinsurgency operations, tactics, or techniques. Clearly, counterinsurgency is no longer part of the Guatemalan military doctrine.

The new external defense doctrine also addresses appropriate peacetime roles and limited support activities like those listed above. *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* states that the peacetime duties of the military are education, training, strategic readiness, international peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 32). Participation in peacekeeping, counternarcotics, and humanitarian assistance operations promotes regional stability, combats transnational crime, and provides humanitarian assistance. These are all appropriate and positive peacetime roles that are compatible with an external defense doctrine.

Another publication from the Guatemalan minister of defense office is *Plan de Modernización 2005* (2005 Modernization Plan), which is the military's vision statement. It provides direction by indicating Peace Accord compliance efforts and force modernization plans that will guide the military through 2005. Published in January 2000, *Plan de Modernización 2005* asserts that the Guatemalan military is now in complete concurrence with *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* pending ratification of the proposed constitutional amendments (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 15). In reference to

doctrine, *Plan de Modernización 2005* affirms the publication of a new external defense doctrine that is in line with the Peace Accords and in the process of being verified by the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA)), an organization established to monitor the implementation of the Peace Accords (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 15). *Plan de Modernización 2005* also expressly reiterates that this new doctrine is in line with the Constitution and the spirit of the final Peace Accord (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 20).

Both *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* and *Plan de Modernización 2005* clearly indicate the current state of Guatemalan military doctrine. The new doctrine is based on external defense centered on the protection of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity as the new military doctrine. It addresses internal security as only an extraordinary and limited function under control of civilian authority. Counterinsurgency is no longer part of the Guatemalan military doctrine. In addition, the new doctrine incorporates appropriate peacetime roles that promote regional stability, combat transnational crime, and provide humanitarian assistance. Clearly, the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions.

Organization

As the thirty-six year civil war progressed, the organizational structure of the Guatemalan military went through several changes in order to improve operational efficiency. For instance, the Guatemalan military's highest command, the Army General

Staff, reorganized as the National Defense Staff in 1983. The new National Defense Staff organization included an inspector general and five new major staff sections: personnel (D-1), intelligence (D-2), operations (D-3), logistics (D-4), and civil affairs (D-5) (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 229). Duplicating the new staff system at every level of command, the Guatemalan military's command structure, now similar to that of many militaries through the world, operated more efficiently. While some of these staff sections became associated with wartime atrocities (most notably, the D-2 sections who regularly conducted interrogations that included torture and ended with assassination), the violent acts resulted from unjust policies and not from the staff system itself. The organizational change that led to the new staff system is an appropriate adjustment that is practical for any military. However, some developments in the Guatemalan military organizational structure were specific to counterinsurgency operations and only applicable during the internal conflict. Figure 1 depicts the wartime organization of the Guatemalan Military.

The most obvious organizational development in the Guatemalan military was the increase in the number of forces. Throughout the thirty-six years of war, the size of the military fluctuated relative to the intensity of the fighting. Yet, the number of combat troops always remained greater than what would be necessary in peacetime. The complex operational plans that supported the Guatemalan counterinsurgency doctrine required a large number of forces to conduct combat operations and control the civilian population throughout the country. As a result, the Guatemalan military had an authorized strength of 46,900 officers and enlisted when the conflict ended in 1996 (Ejército de Guatemala 1998, 8).

In addition to a large force, the Guatemalan military also developed organizational commands to specifically support the counterinsurgency effort. In 1983, the military divided the country into twenty-two zones in order to provide positive territorial control (Nyrop 1983, 195). A presidential-appointed senior combat arms officer (either a general or a colonel) commanded each military zone. These military zones provided for a military presence throughout the country “to ensure the security and trust of the population” (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 230). Consisting of a headquarters with attached troop units, military zones generally aligned with regional districts. However, there were more military zones with larger numbers of combat troops in the areas where guerrilla activity was traditionally heaviest. The twenty-two military zones supported the counterinsurgency campaign plans by providing regional command and control for combat operations and population control throughout all of Guatemala.

In order to help ensure population loyalty and control throughout the country, the Guatemalan military established Civil Defense Patrols in villages and cities. Formalized in 1983, Civil Defense Patrols consisted of armed and unarmed male civilians that operated under the direction of the military zone Civil Affairs officer. This auxiliary force acted as the “eyes and ears of the army” by “reporting to the authorities any persons, facts, or situations that appear suspicious” (Schirmer 1998, 90). Many of the Civil Defense Patrols came under the control of local military commissioners. Around since the 1960s, military commissioners were local civilians of influence, such as plantation owners, industrialists, bodyguards, and university affiliates, that were authorized by the military to carry weapons and enforce security measures (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 199). With as many as 1,300,000 members at one time,

Civil Defense Patrols became a force multiplier in the Guatemalan military's counterinsurgency effort and directly involved local citizens in the government's war effort (Schirmer 1998, 91). While the Civil Defense Patrols were responsible for numerous human rights violations and wartime atrocities, many people joined to avoid personal and community punishment from the Guatemalan military (Stoll 1993a, 99). As part of the military's organization, Civil Defense Patrols conducted operations against guerrilla forces and the civilian population in direct support of counterinsurgency campaign plans.

As part of its counterinsurgency campaign, the Guatemalan military also took steps to ensure public security, especially in major cities, by taking control of normal police functions. In 1965, the military established the Mobile Military Police (PMA) to keep order in poor communities and fight crime inside the military ranks. During the war, the Mobile Military Police supported counterinsurgency plans by providing control and surveillance of the civilian population (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 109). The control measures employed often violated civil rights. Citing incompetence and corruption, the Guatemalan military took control of the National Police, the country's civilian police organization, in 1982 (Schirmer 1998, 25). Officially under the minister of the interior, the National Police took direction from the minister of defense through the military officers appointed as police directors. In addition to normal police activities, the National Police also investigated suspected guerrillas and insurgency supporters. These investigations often relied on coercion and interrogation of citizens. In support of the counterinsurgency campaign, the National Police became a tool of state repression (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 108). As part of the Guatemalan military

organization, both the Mobile Military Police and the National Police were integral parts of the counterinsurgency and internal security effort.

In 1982, the Guatemalan military created a new organization, the Presidential General Staff (Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP)), to serve as “an independent place to handle affairs of the state” and to serve as the “eyes and ears” of the president for tracking intelligence efforts and human rights cases (Schirmer 1998, 173). While not a usual function of the military, the Presidential General Staff provided a useful service since there was no civilian presidential staff to coordinate the president’s matters. However, what started as a personal staff and security for the president and his family transitioned to espionage (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 107). In the name of counterinsurgency, the Presidential General Staff conducted its own intelligence collection operations, not only against the insurgents, but also against the president’s political opposition. The Presidential General Staff controlled agents throughout the country and was responsible for some of the most outrageous atrocities that included abduction, torture, execution, forced disappearance, and subversive infiltration of human rights organizations (Schirmer 1998, 173). Although the Presidential General Staff provided a useful service as a presidential staff, this was not a proper function for the military, especially given its criminal intelligence activities in support of political aims.

The final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, signed on 29 December 1996, brought an end to the civil war as well as an end to the need to fight a counterinsurgency. As part of the reconstruction and reconciliation process, the Peace Accords mandated certain changes to the Guatemalan military organization. Similar to the required changes to military doctrine, the necessary organizational changes appear

throughout all the Peace Accords, but particularly in *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*. In *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the Commission for Historical Clarification also recommends certain changes to the Guatemalan military organization.

In reference to the actual size of the military, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* states:

The size and resources of the Guatemalan armed forces shall be sufficient to enable them to discharge their function of defending Guatemala's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and shall be commensurate with the country's economic capabilities. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 13)

The Peace Accord then goes on to specify several modifications to the military's size and budget, to include "reducing the size of the armed forces of Guatemala by 33 percent in 1997, relative to its current size and organization" (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 20). This 33 percent force reduction with a one-year suspense is one of the most specific and straightforward mandates of the Peace Accords.

Neither the Peace Accords nor the Commission for Historical Clarification report address the military zone organizational command structure. However, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* does direct:

Reorganizing the deployment of military forces in the country, in 1997, assigning them for the purposes of national defense, border patrol and protection of sea, land and air jurisdiction. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 19)

This reorganization directive indicates that the countrywide disposition of the military should be consistent with the military's new peacetime roles and not based on a strictly

internal security role. The Peace Accord allows the Guatemalan military to determine how to best organize in order to meet the directive.

Recognizing the oppressive and undemocratic nature of the counterinsurgency Civil Defense Patrols that led to numerous human rights violations, *Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights*, one of the early Peace Accords signed on 29 March 1994, stipulates that:

The Government of Guatemala shall unilaterally declare that it shall not encourage the organization of nor shall it establish further volunteer civil defense committees in any part of the national territory provided that there is no reason for it to do so. (Republic of Guatemala 1994, 3)

Two years later, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* orders the disbandment of these patrols, officially known as Voluntary Civil Defense Committees (CVDC):

The Government shall ask the Congress of the Republic to repeal the decree creating CVDCs, effective on the day of the signing of the agreement on a firm and lasting peace. Demobilization and disarming of CVDCs shall take place within 30 days from the repeal of the decree. The CVDCs including those already demobilized, shall no longer have any institutional relationship with the armed forces of Guatemala and shall not be restructured in such a way as to restore that relationship. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 19)

With the signing of the final Peace Accord, all remaining Civil Defense Patrols are to demobilize and disband.

As with the Civil Defense Patrols, the Mobile Military Police also must disband when the internal conflict ends. Based on the change in the Guatemalan military's role from counterinsurgency to external defense, internal security and police functions become the responsibility of a civilian police force. Also considering the Mobile Military

Police's wartime crimes against humanity, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* directs that:

The mobile military police shall be disbanded within one year from the signing of the agreement on a firm and lasting peace, at the end of which time its members will have been demobilized. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 19)

No longer responsible for internal police functions, the Guatemalan military must demobilize and inactivate the Mobile Military Police.

Since the Guatemalan military is no longer responsible for internal security, it must relinquish control of all police forces. *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* asserts:

Accordingly, the restructuring of the country's existing police forces into a single National Civil Police, which would be responsible for public order and internal security, is necessary and cannot be delayed. This new police force should be professional and under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 8)

This Peace Accord goes on to provide detailed guidelines for the disposition, structure, size, recruitment, and education of the national police force. But, the most significant is that the National Civil Police is under the sole authority of the minister of the interior, a civilian government organization, and not under the direction of the minister of defense.

Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime reinforces this by directing the following addition to the Constitution:

The National Civil Police is a professional and hierarchical institution. It is the only armed police force with national jurisdiction and its function is to protect and safeguard the exercise of the rights and freedoms of individuals; to prevent, investigate and combat crime; and to maintain public order and internal security. It shall be under the control of civilian authorities and shall show strict respect for human rights in carrying out its functions. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 6)

Although the old National Police also officially came under the minister of the interior, these Peace Accord directives remove any military influence over the new National Civil Police (PNC) by clearly defining the civilian chain of command for the police force.

The Commission for Historical Clarification's *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations* also confirms the civilian control of police functions:

That under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, the PNC begin a process of internal reflection in consultation with organizations from civil society, with the aim of producing and defining the doctrine of the civilian security forces. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 64)

With respect to the Guatemalan military, it can no longer direct civilian police forces.

Although part of the Presidential General Staff provided a crucial service as a presidential staff, this is not a proper function for a military within a democracy.

Consequently, *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations* states:

That the Presidential and Vice-presidential General Staff (*Estado Mayor Presidencial y Vicepresidencial*) structures be abolished, being unnecessary in a democratic State. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 60)

Moreover, the Presidential General Staff's additional criminal intelligence activities in support of political aims, to include horrendous civil and human rights violations, justify the call to disband the organization. In its 1999 report on human rights violations of the civil war, *Guatemala, Never Again*, the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala advises that "the Presidential General Staff (EMP) must be abolished and its activities thoroughly investigated" (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 322). The Peace Accords agree with the removal of the Presidential General Staff but also

realize that some staff and security jobs that support the president are necessary.

Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society provides for such jobs outside the military:

In order to guarantee the security of the President, Vice-President and their families and provide logistical support for the activities carried out by the Presidency of the Republic, the President of the Republic, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by law and in order to replace the Presidential Chief of Staff, shall organize an appropriate entity as he sees fit. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 15)

This allows the creation of a civilian presidential staff and the deactivation of the Presidential General Staff so that, in accordance with the rest of the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan military is no longer in a position to overly influence the functions of the civilian executive branch.

The final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, brought an end to the civil war and implemented all the other accords. The practicality of peace and the Peace Accords compel the Guatemalan military to change its organizational structure to facilitate its new peacetime roles instead of counterinsurgency operations. This means reducing the military by 33 percent, reorganizing the deployment of forces to better support the new peacetime roles, disbanding the Civil Defense Patrols, demobilizing the Mobile Military Police, relinquishing control of the new National Civil Police, and abolishing the Presidential General Staff. Figure 2 depicts the new peacetime organization of the Guatemalan military as it is today.

As directed in the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan military reduced its forces by 33 percent before the end of 1997 (Ejército de Guatemala 1998, 8). Starting with an authorized strength of 46,900, the Guatemalan military reduced its force structure by

15,477 positions and now has an authorized strength of 31,423. As outlined in the Guatemalan minister of defense publication, *Plan de Modernización 2005* (2005 Modernization Plan), this force reduction was the result of unit deactivations and personnel discharges. The unit deactivations included four military zones, the Mobile Military Police, twenty-two infantry battalions, and one company of the National Palace Guard (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 14-15). The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA)) verified the 33 percent force reduction and the unit deactivations on 23 September 1998 and found the Guatemalan military in compliance with the Peace Accords (Ejército de Guatemala 1999a, 17).

Required to reorganize the deployment of forces in order to better support the new peacetime roles, the Guatemalan military decided to change its military zone system. The military zone system supported the counterinsurgency effort by ensuring a military presence throughout the country, especially in areas with large guerrilla concentrations. First, the Guatemalan military deactivated four military zones that had provided for a greater military presence in traditional insurgent stronghold areas. Military Zone 4 in Salamá and Military Zone 8 in Chiquimula deactivated in April 1997; Military Zone 9 in Jalapa deactivated in June 1997; and Military Zone 14 in Sololá deactivated in July 1997 (Ejército de Guatemala 1998, 8). Next, the Guatemalan military changed to a new regional system for its command structure. Established in the December 1999 version of *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* (Guatemalan Army Doctrine), regions replace military zones as the major operational commands. The regions equate to theaters of operation based on the external defense of Guatemala's territorial integrity (Ministerio de

la Defensa Nacional 1999, 34). The land forces are divided into eight regions (North, Central Northwest, Northwest, West, Southwest, Central, Southeast, and East) the air forces are divided into three regions (North, La Aurora (Central), and South), and the naval forces have one region for each coast (Pacific and Atlantic) (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 15). Unlike military zones where some were landlocked, all regional commands have responsibility for some part of the country's international border, major waterways, or airspace. The new regional command system also allows the military to forward deploy forces throughout the country in order to readily support new peacetime functions, particularly humanitarian relief efforts after a natural disaster (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 38). Such forward presence allowed the Guatemalan military to quickly provide critical humanitarian relief assistance to the public before, during, and immediately after Hurricane Mitch hit the country in late 1998. Most countries in Latin America use a similar zone or regional command structure to support counternarcotics, humanitarian assistance, environmental law enforcement, and border control efforts throughout the territory. Now, the actual bases of the military zones that were not deactivated are still under the control of the military and exist as subcommands under the regional commands (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 34). However, these military zones no longer have responsibility for territorial administration and now respond to regional external defense and peacetime support requirements. The reorganization into regional commands is complete and in the process of verification by MINUGUA. Regional commands provide for the countrywide disposition of the military in support of its new peacetime roles. The new regional

command structure of the Guatemalan military fulfills the reorganization directive of the Peace Accords.

Military support for the Civil Defense Patrols was already on the decline before the signing of the final Peace Accord. So, the Guatemalan military was able to totally deactivate and disarm all of the Civil Defense Patrols by 22 October 1997 (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 14). A major event in the implementation of the Peace Accords, disbanding the Civil Defense Patrols marked a significant advance toward a lasting peace in Guatemala. Since then, MINUGUA verified and certified the Peace Accord mandated deactivation of all Civil Defense Patrols (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 14).

In accordance with the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan military also completed demobilization of the Mobile Military Police in November 1997 (Ejército de Guatemala 1998, 8). Soon after, MINUGUA certified the demobilization (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 14). Moreover, the Guatemalan military no longer directs National Police activities. As required by the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan government recreated its police force as the National Civil Police under the minister of the interior. Active duty military officers do not serve with the police anymore and the minister of defense has no influence over the new National Civil Police. In agreement with the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan military's *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* only addresses police functions only as a support function in extreme circumstances, under control of a civilian authority, at the direction of the president, and with the consent of the congress (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999). The Mobile Military Police no longer exist and the Guatemalan military no longer controls the national police force.

The Guatemalan military understands the rationale behind the demand to abolish the Presidential General Staff. In fact, all indications are that the Guatemalan military is ready to deactivate both the Presidential General Staff and the Vice-presidential General Staff. However, the Guatemalan government has yet to establish a functional civilian presidential staff to take over those legitimate services the Presidential General Staff does provide. For that reason, the former President Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen asked the Guatemalan military to retain the Presidential General Staff and current President Alfonso Portillo has yet to abolish the Presidential General Staff. The Guatemalan government made some progress in establishing a separate civilian security service for the president, vice-president and their families, as well as a civilian controlled national intelligence service. Consequently, the Presidential General Staff no longer has an intelligence function. But, the government is still developing a civilian organization to provide necessary logistical and staff support for the executive branch. Until that is done, the president is likely to retain the Presidential General Staff. Even though the Guatemalan military is ready to deactivate the Presidential General Staff, this military organization still exists and will continue to exist until a civilian presidential staff is in place.

Some developments in the Guatemalan military organizational structure were specific to counterinsurgency operations and only applicable during the internal conflict. Therefore, with the end of the civil war, the Guatemalan military began to change its organizational structure in order to support its new external defense and peacetime functions. Also, the Peace Accords mandated a lot of these organizational changes in order to remove those aspects of the military organization meant to control the civilian

population. Since 1996, the Guatemalan military reduced its force structure by 33 percent, reorganized into a regional command structure to better support peacetime roles, disbanded the Civil Defense Patrols, demobilized the Mobile Military Police, and relinquished control over national police forces. However, the Guatemalan military has yet to abolish the Presidential General Staff. Ready to do so, but waiting for the formation of a civilian presidential staff, the Guatemalan military must eliminate the Presidential General Staff in order to complete the changes necessary to only support its new peacetime role and missions.

Training System

Throughout the years, the Guatemalan military developed a training system to prepare its officers and enlisted to serve in defense of the nation. For officers, training begins at the Escuela Politécnica, Guatemala's military academy, founded in 1873 (Nyrop 1983, 198). For the enlisted, training begins with a twelve-week basic training course that includes basic military training, physical education, and weapons familiarization (Nyrop 1983, 196). The vast majority of this military training is applicable to both counterinsurgency and external defense. Many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures trained by the Guatemalan military are effective against guerrilla forces as well as foreign invaders or belligerents in a peacekeeping scenario. However, during the thirty-six years of civil war, the Guatemalan military also developed some training programs that are particular to counterinsurgency warfare.

The Escuela Politécnica is a four-year professional military academy that develops cadets to serve as officers in the Guatemalan military through training a

combination of general military training and university-level academics. Nevertheless, the Escuela Politécnica did adapt some of its curriculum in order to prepare the cadets to fight in a counterinsurgency. In 1961, based on irregular warfare training received by a few officers in the United States, the Escuela Politécnica created a mandatory course called *Tactic IV – Guerrillas y Contra-Guerrillas* (Schirmer 1998, 15). This course taught cadets how to conduct military operations against an insurgency. It also included techniques developed in the field and tactics based on Guatemala's current counterinsurgency doctrine. In addition, some charge that training in general at the Escuela Politécnica included "an insidious conditioning that breeds contempt for everything Indian, as well as a visceral disdain for all intellectuals and most politicians" (Perera 1993, 48).

In the 1970s, the Guatemalan military developed a special operations field tactics school and created a corresponding special forces unit. Both known as Kiabil, the school and unit specialized in jungle warfare and small unit tactics. Similar to the United States Army Ranger School and 75th Ranger Regiment relationship, officers and enlisted can attend the Kiabil school but do not have to be in the Kiabil unit; however, members of the Kiabil unit must pass the Kiabil course. A highly trained unit and strategic asset, the Kiabiles were employed quite extensively throughout the civil war. Both the Kiabil school and the Kiabil unit trained in counterinsurgency techniques and police functions (Nyrop 1983, 201). Both also stressed the use of deadly force and strict obedience to the chain of command. Distinguished by their maroon berets, the Kiabil units became associated with brutality and grievous war atrocities in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

Aside from these specific training systems designed to support the counterinsurgency, all of the Guatemalan military's training generally reflected the counterinsurgency doctrine. Given the brutality of the war, observers contend that the army developed a training system based on obedience and complicity in atrocities (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 128). Some training in certain branches of the military particularly displayed a lack of respect for civil rights. For example, selected intelligence training included clandestine operations techniques and abductions (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 155) while some civil affairs specialists trained to penetrate local populations through psychological warfare and surveillance (Schirmer 1998, 107). This type of training reflected the general disrespect for human rights displayed throughout war. Overall though, Guatemalan military training was set up to support the ongoing counterinsurgency operations of the military.

When *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace* ended the civil war on 29 December 1996, the Guatemalan military stopped fighting against an insurgency. Without an insurgent enemy force, the Guatemalan military no longer had a reason to conduct specific counterinsurgency training. The change in military roles, missions, and doctrine drives the necessary changes to the Guatemalan military system. Military training must now relate to external defense and the new peacetime missions in order for the military to remain relevant and mission capable.

As with military doctrine and military organization, the Peace Accords also mandated certain changes to Guatemalan military training that support the reconstruction and reconciliation process. However, in recognition of the technical nature of training, the Peace Accords address training in very general terms, leaving decisions on specific

training system modifications to the military experts. Making a distinction between education and training, the Peace Accords call for systematic changes to both in order to support the new peace and the principles of democracy. In reference to military education, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* states:

The necessary amendments shall continue to be made to the corresponding regulations so that the military education system is consistent, in its philosophical framework, with respect for the Guatemalan Constitution and other laws, with a culture of peace and democratic coexistence, with the doctrine defined in this Agreement, and with national values, the integral development of the individual, knowledge of our national history, respect for human rights and the identity and rights of the indigenous peoples, and the primacy of the individual. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 13)

In reference to military training, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* asserts:

The Government shall adapt and modify the content of those courses created in the context of the armed conflict with a view to counterinsurgency, to make them compatible with the new military education system and to guarantee the dignity of those involved, their observance of human rights, and the public-spiritedness of their role. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 20)

The Peace Accords are very direct in requiring that the military education and training systems support the new military doctrine, concepts of democracy, and respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the exact development and function of new education and training systems is left up to the Guatemalan military.

In order to preserve the new peace, the Commission for Historical Clarification also recommends several adjustments to the Guatemalan military training system in *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification*

Conclusions and Recommendations. In one section on military education reform, the report outlines several recommendations, to include:

That the CEH's Report be studied as part of the Guatemalan Army's educational curriculum (and) that the civilian Faculty of the Guatemalan Army's training center be made up of persons of recognized democratic trajectory. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 62)

These two points reinforce the Peace Accords by also promoting changes to the training system that focus on respect for democracy and human rights. Yet, the Commission for Historical Clarification goes one step further by calling for the complete revision of all counterinsurgency training:

That, in conformity with the principles of military doctrine and education stated previously, the training programs of the armed forces be subject to drastic and profound revision, especially those conceived specifically for counterinsurgency, such as that known as the *Kaibil* School. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 63)

Here, the commission rightfully recommends the removal of the counterinsurgency focus from all Guatemalan military training.

The Archdiocese of Guatemala also addresses Guatemalan military training in its 1999 report, *Guatemala, Never Again*. Based on its independent investigation into the human rights violations of the civil war, the Archdiocese of Guatemala makes certain recommendations for social reconstruction and reconciliation. Referring to military training, the report suggests that:

The military instruction systems for officers, soldiers, and specialists must undergo a comprehensive reform process, because the existing systems pose an ongoing threat to social peace. At the same time, centers that epitomize the aggression waged against the population, such as Ranger School, must be closed. (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 322)

Echoing the calls for military training and education reform found in the Peace Accords and the Commission for Historical Clarification report, the Archdiocese of Guatemala wants the Guatemalan military training system to incorporate the concepts of democracy and respect for human rights. However, given the Kiabiles reputation for brutality, the Archdiocese of Guatemala does not think revising Kiabil training is enough. It wants to see the Kiabil school (referred to as Ranger School) completely closed down.

In response to the Peace Accords and in view of the new peaceful environment, the Guatemalan military changed its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations. The Guatemalan minister of defense publication, *Plan de Modernización 2005*, declares the development of a completely new military education system in accordance with the Peace Accords that is in the process of being verified by MINUGUA (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 15). This new military education system represents one of the most important and comprehensive changes in the Guatemalan military following the Peace Accords (Ejército de Guatemala 1999a, 17).

Part Four, *Military Education and Training*, of the Guatemalan military's new peacetime doctrine, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala*, outlines the new military education system. In agreement with the Peace Accords, the new military education system promotes respect for the Guatemalan Constitution and laws, the culture of peace and democratic coexistence, the new military doctrine, the national values, the integral development of the individual, knowledge of national history, respect for human rights, the identity and rights of the indigenous peoples, and the primacy of the individual (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 50). *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* goes on to describe the new military education system and how each portion of the system

supports promotion of democratic ideals and respect for human rights (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 50-53). This new system consists of an education system and a training system. The education system encompasses officer education and professional development from the Escuela Politécnica through officer basic and advance courses, staff college, senior leadership college, and professional seminars. The training system consists of all technical and tactical institutional training for both officers and enlisted. The technical training equates to combat support and combat service support functions while tactical training relates to enlisted basic training and specialty combat training, such as airborne and Kiabil.

Although the Archdiocese of Guatemala recommended closing the school, the Kiabil school and Kiabil unit still exist. However, the Guatemalan military did revise the Kiabil training programs to remove the counterinsurgency portions and to meet all the requirements of the Peace Accords and the Commission for Historical Clarification. The Kiabil school is now a jungle warfare and commando school that conforms to the principles of the new military doctrine and the new military education system.

The Guatemalan military adapted and modified the content of both existing and new training programs in order to make them compatible with the new military education system. This includes the curriculum at the Escuela Politécnica, the Kiabil school, the Intelligence training program, and the Civil Affairs training program. All of the training formerly focused on counterinsurgency is now in accordance with the new military education system, the Peace Accords, and the ideals of human rights (Schirmer 1998, 269). The military instruction systems for officers, soldiers, and specialists underwent a

comprehensive reform process. Now the Guatemalan military training system supports the military's new role and missions, not counterinsurgency.

The Current Condition of the Guatemalan Military

The new peace also required the military to relinquish much of its control over governmental functions and to transition to a more professional military. Giving up control of governmental functions is part of the overall Guatemalan government transformation necessary to address several concerns of the guerrillas, the Guatemalan people, and the international community. For the Guatemalan military to become more professional, it also must address concerns about human rights violations, civilian control, and support to democracy. All these concerns are delineated in the United Nations mediated Peace Accords and the Commission for Historical Clarification report.

The second part of the transition relates to the current condition of the military that indicates its level of professionalism and support to democracy. Many aspects of the Guatemalan military's current condition relate to the changes the Guatemalan military's internal structure previously discussed. Those changes support and lead to conditional changes. If the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy, then it has transitioned to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. In order for this to be true, the following conditions must exist: The Guatemalan military must have a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement; it must support the ideals of democracy and must profess respect for human rights; and it must recognize its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. The thirty-six years of civil war and its conclusion in

December 1996 set the conditions for the Guatemalan military's transition from war to peace. The following is an evaluation of each one of the conditions in order to determine if, in fact, they exist.

Professionalism of the Officer Corps

In 1990, as chief of staff of the Army, General Carl E. Vuono wrote:
A professional in the Army is a leader who is expert in the profession of arms, is responsible for soldiers and units, is committed to the defense of the nation and is bound by a strong ethical framework. (Vuono 1990, 3)

Even though General Vuono defines the individual military professional and not a professional military unit, his words highlight the link between military professionalism and ethical behavior. General Vuono's definition also points out the key concept of service to nation. A definition of military professionalism can also be derived from the United States Southern Command's vision statement:

A community of democratic, stable and prosperous nations successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats; served by professional, modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for human rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses to challenges. (U.S. Southern Command 1999, 2)

This vision statement suggests that a professional military follows democratic principles, shows respect for human rights, and is subordinate to a civil authority. Therefore, drawing from the above ideas, a professional military is one that recognizes its subordination to civilian authority, supports the ideals of democracy, respects human rights, and values service to nation over personal advancement. The last two sections of this chapter analyze the Guatemalan military's support for the ideals of democracy, their respect for human rights, and their support for subordination to civilian authority as

components of military professionalism. However, this section focuses on the value of service to nation over personal advancement as an integral part of a professional officer corps.

During the thirty-six years of civil war, the counterinsurgency doctrine developed and implemented by the Guatemalan government allowed the Guatemalan military to gain control over government functions and the civilian population. In the name of internal security, the Guatemalan military exercised a wide range of autonomous powers, especially through its elaborate intelligence network and control of police functions. This limited civil rights and led to military impunity (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 24). Consequently, individual military officers, especially those at the higher levels, possessed a great degree of influence throughout society. Some of those military officers took advantage of the situation and used that influence for personal advancement.

Some military officers used the power associated with military credentials to make accusations and denunciations in order to blackmail people and obtain personal favors (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 127). Other senior officers, to include Deputy Head-of-State Lobos Zamora and Head of State Mejía Victores in the 1980s, profited greatly from an organized black market (Simon 1987, 197). Given the responsibility to enforce forest conservation, individual officers gained control over the contraband hardwood lumber trade and attempted to exploit the oil fields discovered in the Petén region (Perera 1993, 241).

The culture of the officer corps at that time allowed these acts of illegal and unprofessional profiteering to occur. Over time, the Guatemalan military's officer corps had developed an internal system to promote loyalty and mentorship. This system relied

on the fraternal structure of the Guatemalan military academy, the Escuela Politécnica. There, cadets developed strong bonds of loyalty with members of their graduating class known as “promoción” (Nyrop 1983, 191). Also, more experienced officers assumed mentorship responsibility for certain junior officers in a relation known as “centenario” (Nyrop 1983, 191). Based on the continuous rank ordering of Escuela Politécnica graduates, centenario compelled graduate number 258 to look after graduate number 358 and both of them looked after graduate number 458 (Nyrop 1983, 191). The promoción and centenario systems developed an intense loyalty shared among members of the officer corps. Without proper emphasis on professionalism, support to democracy, and the rule of law within the military education system, officer corps loyalty became the highest order of duty. This Escuela Politécnica subculture, based on loyalty and discipline, allowed officers to commit illegal and unprofessional acts for personal advancement without fear of retribution because the other officers, in their misplaced loyalty to the officer corps, kept quiet (Schirmer 1998, 155).

The signing of the final Peace Accord on 29 December 1996 began a process of reconstruction and reconciliation within Guatemala. The new peace also necessitated changes in the Guatemalan military as it transitioned from wartime to peacetime. In fact, the actual Peace Accords, particularly *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, and the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala mandated specific changes in Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training. The Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala also recommended modifications to Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training in order to promote the protection of human rights. These

proposed changes to the internal structure of the military also affect the current conditions in the Guatemalan military. These conditions indicate the level of professionalism and support to democracy that exists within the military. Furthermore, several of the reforms influence the professionalism of the Guatemalan officer corps and its promotion of service to the nation over personal advancement.

All the previously discussed reforms that affect Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training also generally promote professionalism in the Guatemalan officer corps as well as the concept of service to the nation over personal advancement. Some of those reforms even directly address the issues of professionalism, service to the nation, and personal advancement. In *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala directs the Guatemalan government to promote a new military doctrine that includes the following principles:

The Army organization is hierarchical and based on the principles of discipline and obedience within the law. The Army is apolitical. It should remain at the margins of party politics and respect all those political forces legally constituted. Members of the military accept the limitation inherent in their career, specifically intended to preserve the apolitical nature of the institution, that, whilst they are in military service, they may not affiliate to, nor become a member of, any party or trade union. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 61-62)

These principles reinforce the concept of service to the nation over personal advancement in two ways. First, they address the environment of criminal complacency created through intense officer corps loyalty by indicating that military obedience should never include actions outside of the law. Second, they address the problem of personal advancement through politics by stressing the apolitical and limited nature of a military career.

The ninth Peace Accord, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, includes the concept of service to the nation in its directed reforms for the Guatemalan military education system:

The necessary amendments shall continue to be made to the corresponding regulations so that the military education system is consistent, in its philosophical framework, with respect for the Guatemalan Constitution and other laws, with a culture of peace and democratic coexistence, with the doctrine defined in this Agreement, and with national values. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 13)

This concept requires the military education system to emphasize the same ideals of military professionalism that are to be part of the new military doctrine, such as respect for the rule of law, democracy, and national values. That same Peace Accord goes on to reiterate the same concepts when it addresses military training:

The Government shall adapt and modify the content of those courses . . . to make them compatible with the new military education system and to guarantee the dignity of those involved, their observance of human rights, and the public-spiritedness of their role. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 20)

Not only must military training agree with the new military education system, but this passage also underscores the military's role of service to the nation.

Additionally, the Peace Accords look to include the concepts of military professionalism and service to the nation over personal advancement in Guatemala's Constitution. *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime* mandates certain specific amendments to the existing Constitution as part of the reconstruction and reconciliation process. This Peace Accord calls for Article 244, *Constitution, Organization and Functions of the Armed Forces*, of the Guatemalan Constitution to read:

The Guatemalan armed forces are a permanent institution in the service of the nation. They are unique and indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical,

obedient and non-deliberative. Their function is to defend the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of its territory. They consist of land, sea and air forces. Their organization is hierarchical and is based on the principles of discipline and obedience. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 7)

This effectively makes the apolitical and nondeliberative characteristics of a professional military a legal requirement. The Peace Accord also directs amending Article 219,

Military Courts, to read:

The military courts shall take cognizance of the crimes and misdemeanors specified in the military code and in the corresponding regulations. Ordinary crimes and misdemeanors committed by military personnel shall be tried and judged by the ordinary courts. No civilian may be judged by military courts. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 8)

Developed during the counterinsurgency war, the Constitution currently provides military courts with sole jurisdiction over military personnel, regardless of the offense. On the other hand, the military courts can also assert jurisdiction over any civilian for reasons of national security. This means Guatemalan military officers are not held accountable for their crimes since they can only be tried by the court system that they themselves control. However, the constitutional amendment will now hold military personnel criminally accountable to an outside authority, removing the judicial protection that currently allows officers to commit illegal and unprofessional acts for personal advancement without fear of retribution. Thus, the constitutional amendment reinforces professionalism within the Guatemalan officer corps and promotes service to the nation over personal advancement.

Recognizing that the autonomous power of the Guatemalan military allowed officers to act outside the law for personal advancement, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala sought to more directly affirm the primacy of the rule of law in a professional military. In *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission*

for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations, the commission calls for a military code of conduct that emphasizes lawful conduct above all and downplays misplaced allegiances to internal groups:

That a new Military Code be drafted and put into effect based on legal, moral and doctrinal criteria in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic and the reforms to the same derived from the Peace Accords. That the Military Code include the correct concept, already contained in the Constitution of the Republic, of discipline and obedience solely within the law and never outside it, and that reference be removed in the Military Code to obedience being owed to whatever kind of order. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 60)

In its report, the commission again promotes the ideals of lawful conduct and public service as some of the fundamental principles of a professional military that the Guatemalan military must adopt:

That the basic values of members of the military must conform to the following concepts and fundamental principles. That military discipline has to be based on the concept of strict obedience within the law, and never outside it. That the esprit de corps must conform to a high standard of ethics and be based on principles of justice and public service. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 62)

This focus on the rule of law counters the permissive environment that enabled some officers to act inappropriately for personal advancement and supports the principles of a professional officer corps.

The new peace brought about several changes in the Guatemalan military as it transitioned from wartime to peacetime. Peace also created certain conditions in today's military that are decidedly different from those that were present during the war. The current conditions that exist in the Guatemalan military indicate its level of professionalism and support to democracy. If the current conditions allow for a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement, then

the Guatemalan military has increased its level of professionalism. In addition, changes to the internal structure of the military influence the professionalism of the Guatemalan officer corps and its promotion of service to the nation over personal advancement. Mandated changes to Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training that are meant to reduce military political influence and increase military professionalism also reinforce the concept of service to the nation over personal advancement.

After the signing of the final Peace Accord, the Guatemalan military began developing doctrine, organizational structures, and training systems to support its new peacetime role. In *Memoria de Labores, 365 Dias al Servicio de la Patria*, published in June 1999, the Guatemalan military reports that a new doctrine in line with the Peace Accords was complete and awaiting final revisions (Ejército de Guatemala 1999b, 3). In December 1999, the Guatemalan minister of defense published the final version of a new Guatemalan military doctrine. *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* (Guatemalan Army Doctrine) is the latest version of the Guatemalan military's cornerstone document. It declares the mission and purpose of the military and describes how the military will organize, train, and deploy for operations. *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* begins with a purpose statement that directly addresses those doctrinal changes required by the Peace Accords by stating that this doctrine is in line with the Constitution and the spirit of the final Peace Accord (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, ii). In fact, a thorough reading of *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* confirms that the Guatemalan military now has a new doctrine, organizational structure, and training system that promotes military professionalism, support for democracy, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian authority.

In accordance with *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the new Guatemalan military doctrine lists several doctrinal principles and values that support officer corps professionalism and the concept of service to the nation over personal advancement. These principles and values include: the hierarchical organization of the military based on the principles of discipline and obedience within the law; the apolitical nature of the military so as to remain at the margins of party politics and respect all those political forces legally constituted; the preservation of separation from politics such that active duty military members do not join or affiliate with any party or trade union; the idea of military discipline based on strict obedience within the law; and the concept of esprit de corps based on high standards of ethics, justice, and public service (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 7-8). Furthermore, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* makes no reference to any type of obedience or loyalty owed to any type of entity or organization other than the Guatemalan Constitution.

The Guatemalan military's new doctrine also includes the concept of service to the nation in its military education and training systems. Part Four, *Military Education and Training*, of *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* outlines the new military education and training systems. In agreement with the Peace Accords, the new military education and training systems promote respect for the Guatemalan Constitution and laws, the culture of peace and democratic coexistence, the new military doctrine, the national values, the integral development of the individual, knowledge of national history, respect for human rights, the identity and rights of the indigenous peoples, and the primacy of the individual (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 50). Therefore, the new military

doctrine establishes education and training systems that emphasize military professionalism and service to the nation through respect for the rule of law, democracy, and national values.

Published in January 2000 by the Guatemalan minister of defense office, *Plan de Modernización 2005* (2005 Modernization Plan) provides direction by indicating Peace Accord compliance efforts and force modernization plans that will guide the military through 2005. *Plan de Modernización 2005* asserts that the Guatemalan military is now in complete concurrence with *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* pending ratification of the proposed constitutional amendments (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 15). In reference to doctrine, *Plan de Modernización 2005* affirms the publication of a new external defense doctrine that is in line with the Peace Accords and in the process of being verified by the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA)) (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 15). *Plan de Modernización 2005* also describes the new military education system in some detail. In doing so, it verifies that the new military education system promotes military professionalism, support for democracy, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian authority (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 24).

However, Guatemala has yet to make those constitutional amendments required by the Peace Accords. The legislative branch of the Guatemalan government is responsible for amending the Constitution and the Guatemalan military has no influence in the matter. In May 1999, a nationwide referendum on constitutional reforms

recommended by the Peace Accords failed to pass. Although the referendum was open and fair, the consolidation of some fifty-two amendments under one yes or no vote caused some confusion and consternation that caused the voters to reject the reform package. Nevertheless, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* purposely follows the recommendations of the Peace Accords so that, if the constitutional reforms ever come to pass, the new doctrine will still be valid and will conform to both the Constitution and the Peace Accords. With respect to the military courts, the Guatemalan military reports that it is in the process of determining how to best bring the military justice system in line with and under the control of the national justice system (Ejército de Guatemala 1999b, 3). Also, there is no evidence to indicate that the Guatemalan military courts tried any civilians since the signing of the final Peace Accord. Military courts already award jurisdiction over military personnel to the Guatemalan civil courts on a regular basis.

The promoción and centenario systems of the Escuela Politécnica still exist. However, with the military education system, officer corps loyalty is able to shift from fellow officers to the Guatemalan people. Since the new Guatemalan military doctrine stresses obedience within the law and promotes ethics, justice, and public service, the officer corps will start to associate duty with those democratic concepts and not with individuals. The loyalties attached to the promoción and centenario systems become secondary and relatively insignificant.

Both *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* and *Plan de Modernización 2005* clearly indicate that the Guatemalan military's new doctrine and training systems reduce military political influence, increase military professionalism, and reinforce the concept of service to the nation over personal advancement. Even with the continued existence of

the promoción and centenario systems and without the constitutional reforms, the significant changes to the internal structure of the Guatemalan military still positively influence the professionalism of the Guatemalan officer corps and its promotion of service to the nation over personal advancement. Therefore, the conditions that exist in the Guatemalan military today indicate an increased level of professionalism and support to democracy because they allow for a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement.

Support for Democracy and Respect for Human Rights

In addition to valuing service to nation over personal advancement, a professional military follows democratic principles and shows respect for human rights. The Guatemalan military's level of support for democratic ideals and ability to respect human rights are part of the military's current condition. This acceptance indicates the military's level of professionalism. This section evaluates the Guatemalan military's support for democracy and respect for human rights.

As the thirty-six year civil war progressed, the Guatemalan military's execution of the country's counterinsurgency doctrine led to gross violations of human rights and a blatant disregard for the democratic concept of civil rights. This was especially true concerning the military's treatment of indigenous people and rural peasants. The Guatemalan military's intelligence network carried out some of the most horrific human rights violations of the entire war. However, almost every type of Guatemalan military organization was responsible for some type of human rights violation during the conflict, to include massacres, murders, forced disappearances, rapes, and tortures.

As part of its counterinsurgency policy, particularly between 1980 and 1983, the Guatemalan military routinely annihilated entire communities considered guerrilla social support bases in order to destroy the guerrillas and their infrastructure (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 133). Prompted by accusations of guerrilla involvement, the Guatemalan military, the Civil Defense Patrols, the death squads, and the secret anti-communist police would massacre groups of civilians. The Guatemalan military also forced the disappearance of individuals and then secretly tortured them in order to gather information about insurgent sympathizers (Simon 1987, 225). As part of the massacre and forced disappearance of women, soldiers committed mass rapes, frequently in front of the women's families (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 77). In a form of extended human rights deprivation, patrols regularly destroyed the crops of villages suspected of supporting the guerrillas (Stoll 1993a, 152). Although human rights violations occurred throughout the war, the most numerous and most violent incidents took place in the early 1980s as part of the counterinsurgency operations that supported the National Security Doctrine.

Established by the fifth Peace Accord, *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer*, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala investigated the wartime atrocities of both the Guatemalan government and the umbrella guerrilla organization, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)). After years of research, the commission published *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations* on 25 February 1999. In that

report the commission documented a total of 42,275 victims of human rights violations connected with the armed confrontation (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 17). Through its investigation, the commission also found that agents of the Guatemalan government forces were responsible for 93 percent of the documented violations, to include 92 percent of the arbitrary executions and 91 percent of forced disappearances (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 20). Victims included men, women and children of all social groups; however, in ethnic terms, the vast majority was Mayans (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 20).

The Archdiocese of Guatemala also carried out its own independent investigation into the human rights violations of the civil war. The results of that investigation appeared in a report published in 1999 called *Guatemala, Never Again*. Based on personal testimonies, the Archdiocese of Guatemala reported that 14,291 separate incidents of human rights violations resulted in 53,727 victims (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 304-305). Of that total, the Archdiocese of Guatemala found Guatemalan government military and paramilitary forces responsible for 11,147 incidents and 42,004 victims (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 304-305). This included 25,123 victims of collective murder, 5,537 victims of attack, 5,079 irregular detentions, 4,620 people threatened, 4,219 victims of torture, 3,893 forced disappearances, 715 abducted and later disappeared, and 152 recorded rapes (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 289-290).

As a result of these documented human rights violations and lack of support for the ideals of democracy, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala concluded that Guatemalan government agents, the majority of whom were members of

the military, flagrantly committed acts prohibited by Common Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 37). Furthermore, the majority of human rights violations occurred with the knowledge or by order of the highest authorities of the Guatemalan government, including the entire chain of military command (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 38). In the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, the Guatemalan military clearly committed gross violations of human rights and displayed a blatant disregard for the basic ideals of democracy.

The final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, signed on 29 December 1996, brought an end to the civil war and the need to fight a counterinsurgency. As part of the reconstruction and reconciliation process, the Peace Accords mandated certain changes to the Guatemalan military that would support the ideals of democracy and promote respect for human rights. As part of their independent reports on civil war atrocities, both the Commission for Historical Clarification and the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala recommended specific modifications to Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training in order to promote future protection of human and civil rights. These required and suggested changes to the internal structure of the military also affect the current conditions in the Guatemalan military as a professional organization. These reforms compel the Guatemalan military to support the ideals of democracy and respect human rights.

Given the severity and frequency of human rights violations that occurred throughout Guatemala's civil war, the Peace Accords make every effort to integrate respect for human rights into all aspects of Guatemalan society. With respect to the

Guatemalan military, the Peace Accords look to make respect for human and civil rights a part of the new military culture. *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* requires the Guatemalan military to develop a new doctrine with respect for human rights as a key element:

A new military doctrine shall be formulated in accordance with the reforms envisaged in this Agreement. The doctrine shall encompass respect for the Guatemalan Constitution, human rights . . . and the spirit of the agreements on a firm and lasting peace. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 13)

That Peace Accord reinforces the vital concept of respect for human rights by requiring its inclusion in the Guatemalan military education system:

The necessary amendments shall continue to be made to the corresponding regulations so that the military education system is consistent, in its philosophical framework, with respect for . . . the integral development of the individual, knowledge of our national history, respect for human rights and the identity and rights of the indigenous peoples, and the primacy of the individual. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 13)

Respect for human rights is so crucial to a professional military that this Peace Accord explicitly lists it as part of its prerequisites for future military training:

The Government shall adapt and modify the content of those courses . . . to make them compatible with the new military education system and to guarantee the dignity of those involved, their observance of human rights. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 20)

By including human rights in military doctrine, education, and training, the Peace Accords set the conditions for the Guatemalan military's eventual internalization of respect for human and civil rights.

The Peace Accords' *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer* established the Commission for Historical Clarification

in Guatemala to investigate the civil war human rights violations. After years of research, the commission recommended several governmental and societal changes meant to forever remove the permissive atmosphere that had allowed those human rights atrocities to take place. In its final report, *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the commission directed the Guatemalan government to take certain steps in order to promote respect for human rights in the military. One such step is the development of a new military doctrine based on specific principles, to include the principle that “the Army will base its legal standards, as well as its conduct, on systematic respect for human rights” (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 62). The commission then goes on to list some basic values that military members must be compelled to follow in order to promote peace, democracy, and respect for human rights. One of these values is “that the concept of military honor must be inseparable from respect for human rights” (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 62). These doctrinal and individual standards are meant to compel the Guatemalan military to support the ideals of democracy and respect for human rights.

In response to the Peace Accords and the new peaceful environment, the Guatemalan military made changes to its internal structure that also affect its current condition and indicate its level of professionalism and support for democracy. Many of those changes need to promote support for democratic ideals and respect for human rights, especially given the Guatemalan military’s infamous reputation for gross human rights violations. The Guatemalan military’s protection of human rights and support for

democratic ideals would help effect the higher level of professionalism and support to democracy that is necessary for a successful transition from war to peace.

First and foremost, the Guatemalan military abandoned its counterinsurgency doctrine that encouraged gross violations of human rights and a blatant disregard for the democratic concept of civil rights. The Guatemalan military no longer advocates the National Security Doctrine that relied on massacres, forced disappearances, and torture to subdue guerrillas and guerrilla support bases. The new military doctrine for Guatemala, published in December 1999, advocates professionalism and support for democracy as part of a new peacetime environment.

The Guatemalan military's new peacetime doctrine, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala*, incorporates respect for human rights in every aspect of military operations and training. In accordance with both *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society Guatemala* and *Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the new Guatemalan military doctrine contains basic principles and values that compel respect for human rights. These principles and values are found throughout the new doctrine and include: respect for the Constitution and ordinary laws of Guatemala; respect for human and individual rights; respect for the spirit of the agreements contained in the Peace Accords; equal opportunity and inclusion for all people of every social class, ethnic group, and gender; professional conduct based on systematic respect for human rights; and military honor as inseparable from respect for human rights (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 7-8).

These doctrinal principles and values compel the Guatemalan military to support the ideals of democracy and respect for human rights.

In order to promote the new doctrinal principles of professionalism, support for democracy, and respect for human rights, the Guatemalan military integrated these concepts into the new military education and training systems. As directed by the Peace Accords and the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala, the new military education and training systems promote respect for the Guatemalan Constitution and laws, the culture of peace and democratic coexistence, the new military doctrine, the national values, the integral development of the individual, the knowledge of national history, the respect for human rights, the identity and rights of the indigenous peoples, and the primacy of the individual (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 50).

Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala goes on to describe the new military education and training systems and how each supports promotion of democratic ideals and respect for human rights (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 50-53). *Plan de Modernización 2005* reaffirms that respect for human rights and support for democracy are cornerstone values of the new education system. In its thorough description of future military training programs, *Plan de Modernización 2005* explains that each aspect of the new system promotes military professionalism, support for democracy, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian authority (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 2000, 24).

The new internal structure of the Guatemalan military clearly supports the ideals of democracy and respect for human rights. Guatemala's new military doctrine publicizes new principles and values that compel the Guatemalan military to support the ideals of democracy and to respect human rights. The new military education system

strives to institutionalize these concepts of democracy and respect for human rights throughout the Guatemalan military. Respect for human rights and support for democratic ideals are part of the current character of a Guatemalan military that is now more professional and supportive of democracy. This higher level of professionalism and support to democracy facilitates a successful transition from war to peace.

Subordination to a Democratic Authority

A professional military supports the ideals of democracy, respects human rights, and values service to nation over personal advancement. However, a truly professional military that supports a democracy also recognizes its subordination to a civil authority. As part of its current condition, the Guatemalan military must be under civilian control within a democracy in order to indicate a satisfactory level of military professionalism. This section evaluates the Guatemalan military's subordination to a democratically elected civilian authority.

During the thirty-six years of civil war, the counterinsurgency doctrine developed and implemented by the Guatemalan government allowed the Guatemalan military to gain control over government functions. The Guatemalan military acquired much of its control and influence over government functions during the successive military governments that controlled the country up to 1985. Then, just prior to the 1985 election of a civilian president and the reinstatement of a constitutional government, the Guatemalan military authorities enacted forty separate decrees that guaranteed continuous counterinsurgency operations and legally secured the military's political influence (Schirmer 1998, 31). Therefore, as long as the internal conflict continued, the

Guatemalan military maintained control over the government by dominating administrative functions and obtaining concessions from the executive branch through threats of a coup (Stoll 1993b, 205). As a result, the Guatemalan military operated under its own authority and without any oversight from democratically elected officials.

The Guatemalan military's control of government functions came from its domination of national and local government administration. At the national level, the Presidential General Staff (Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP)) provided military influence over the elected president and the affairs of the state (Schirmer 1998, 173). At the local level, the military zone commanders supervised the regional district governments in order to ensure security (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 230). The Guatemalan military's extensive intelligence structure provided military influence over all branches of the government through the control of information and the threat of retribution (Simon 1987, 221). In fact, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala found that the involvement of military intelligence services in irregular operations was far removed from any legal order so as to guarantee that the work remained covert and to assure that any judicial investigations were ineffective (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 25). The goal was to ensure that military operations, especially intelligence operations, continued under the autonomous control of the Guatemalan military without any outside interference or oversight.

Another major factor that helped maintain military dominance within the Guatemalan government was the status of the minister of defense. The 1985 Constitution of Guatemala states that the minister of defense must be an active member of the military with a rank of colonel or above (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 6). Therefore, the

president, as commander-in-chief, was the only civilian with military responsibilities and authority. Except for the president, the entire Guatemalan military chain of command and corresponding staffs consisted of active duty military officers. Even the president's personal staff, the EMP, was made up of active duty military officers. With only the president to deal with and the entire military structure at his disposal, the active duty officer who served as the minister of defense possessed a great deal of unchecked power. This lack of additional civilian control and oversight made it easy for the Guatemalan military to maintain its autonomy. Even under civilian rule, Guatemala had been less than democratic at times since the military maintained control over many government functions and since some civilian administrations did not assert their democratic authority over the military (Schirmer 1998, 260).

When *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace* ended the civil war on 29 December 1996, the Guatemalan military stopped fighting against an insurgency. Without an insurgent enemy force, the Guatemalan military no longer had a reason to conduct specific counterinsurgency operations and could no longer justify its control over government functions. The change in military roles, missions, and doctrine relieved the Guatemalan military of its internal security duties and removed its claim to internal government responsibilities. The Peace Accord directives, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala findings, and the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala recommendations all call for changes to the Guatemalan government and military in order to reestablish civilian government control and military subordination to a civil authority. These changes to the internal structure of the government also affect the

current condition of the Guatemalan military and are an indicator of its level of professionalism and support to democracy.

As part of the reconstruction and reconciliation process, the Peace Accords mandated certain changes to the Guatemalan political structure in order to bring back civilian control of the government. *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* outlines necessary modifications to the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the Guatemalan government so as to guarantee democratic freedoms to the people and impose civilian government control over the military. In defining the functions of the legislative branch, the Peace Accord confirms the congressional responsibility for executive branch oversight:

Legislative authority belongs to the Guatemalan Congress. Its agenda, minimal and open-ended, will give priority to the following aspects. Proper utilization of constitutional mechanisms for the supervision of the executive branch, to ensure clarity in government policy, consistency in its programs, transparency in the planning and implementation of the State budget, examination and evaluation of the responsibility of ministers and other high-ranking officials for their administrative acts or omissions, and monitoring of government administration to protect the general interests of the population while preserving institutional legitimacy. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 3)

Congressional oversight extends to the Guatemalan military since it is part of the executive branch. This oversight serves to limit the military's previously autonomous power and control over government functions.

Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society also strengthens the powers of the judicial branch and affirms universal jurisdiction:

The reform and modernization of the administration of justice should be geared to preventing the judiciary from producing or covering up a system of impunity and corruption. The judicial process is not a simple procedure regulated by codes and ordinary laws but rather an instrument for ensuring the basic right to justice, which is manifested in a guarantee of impartiality, objectivity, universality and equality before the law. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 4)

In defining the purpose of the judicial process, the Peace Accords emphasize equality, fairness, and the notion that no citizen is above the law, to include military personnel. It also removes military impunity and reestablishes military subordination to civil authority.

A major portion of *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* directs changes to the presidency and the various government ministries “with a view to the strengthening of civilian power and the modernization of the executive branch” (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 12). Among those directed changes are the ones that affect the Guatemalan military doctrine, organization, and training. These changes to the military’s internal structure improve professionalism, bolster democratic ideals, and support military subordination to a civilian authority. In fact, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala requires that the new military doctrine explicitly include certain principles that advocate subordination to a democratic authority. In *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the commission instructs:

That the Government promotes a new military doctrine for the Guatemalan Army. This doctrine should establish the basic principles for the appropriate relationship between the Army and society within a democratic and pluralist framework. The Army should accept that sovereignty resides in the Guatemalan people. As a consequence, the Army should respect whatever social reforms and changes that result from the exercise of this sovereignty, reconciling itself to the mechanisms established in the Constitution. The Army will be subordinate to political power,

which emanates from the ballot box through the procedures established by the Constitution. (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 61-62)

Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society also directs the elimination of those systems and organizations that sustained the Guatemalan military's undue influence over government functions. The Peace Accord moves to remove military influence over the elected president and the affairs of the state by directing that:

The President of the Republic, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by law and in order to replace the Presidential Chief of Staff, shall organize an appropriate entity as he sees fit. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 15)

The organization of a new civilian presidential staff does away with the Presidential General Staff (Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP)), which eliminates the military's means of political influence at the national level.

The Peace Accord also reduces the Guatemalan military's influence over government through information control and intimidation by restricting the military's intelligence functions:

The scope of the activities of the Intelligence Department of the Office of the Chief of Staff for National Defense shall be restricted to the role of the armed forces as defined in the Constitution and in the reforms envisaged in this Agreement. Its structure and resources shall be limited to this scope. (Republic of Guatemala 1996a, 15)

This mandate constrains Guatemalan military intelligence operations to strictly military matters and calls for a reduced intelligence force structure that is in line with the new limited focus. The Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala echoes the call to reduce military intelligence functions. In *Guatemala, Never Again*, the Recovery of Historical Memory Project recommends:

The demilitarization of society is essential to real peace. This refers to demobilization and military reform as well as reducing the army's influence in society. It includes demobilizing the military units, officers, and soldiers most implicated in atrocities; dismantling clandestine security apparatus; and extensive reform of the intelligence system. (Recovery of Historical Memory Project 1999, 322)

The aim of this recommendation is to eliminate the Guatemalan military's autonomous power and ability to influence government functions in order to reestablish control of a civilian authority over the military.

Finally, the Peace Accords address the problem of minimal civilian responsibility and authority over the military since the Constitution requires the minister of defense to be an active duty military officer. *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime* argues that:

Like other Ministers of State, the Minister of Defense is called upon to perform policy-making functions which do not necessarily require that he have a strictly technical background. As a result, the current requirement that he be a member of the armed forces is not justified. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 6)

Therefore, the Peace Accord mandates the amendment of Article 246, *Duties and Powers of the President Over the Armed Forces*, of the Guatemalan Constitution so as to read:

The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and shall issue his orders through the Minister of Defense, whether he is a civilian or a member of the military. (Republic of Guatemala 1996b, 8)

This removes the requirement for the minister of defense to be a military officer, opens the way for a civilian minister of defense staff, and increases civilian government oversight of the military. Like the Peace Accords' other government reforms, this constitutional amendment is meant to strengthen civilian controls over the Guatemalan military and emphasize the Guatemalan military's rightful subordination to a civilian democratic authority.

The final Peace Accord brought an end to the civil war and implemented all the other accords. Without an insurgency to fight, the Guatemalan military no longer had a reason to conduct counterinsurgency operations and no longer had justification to control government functions. The Guatemalan military could now relinquish its internal government responsibilities and establish its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. This would alter the current condition of the Guatemalan military and elevate its level of professionalism and support to democracy. The practicality of peace and the Peace Accords compel the Guatemalan military to change its doctrine, organizational structure, and training system to facilitate its new peacetime roles instead of counterinsurgency operations. Some of these same changes also end military control of government functions and strengthen civilian control over the military.

However, some changes that can help guarantee democratic freedom and impose civilian government control over the military are outside the control of the military. The modifications to the legislative and judicial branches of the Guatemalan government that are mandated by the Peace Accords support the democratic principles of shared powers and rule of law. But neither the executive branch nor the military can manage these changes. Though the Guatemalan military may support these changes, it must wait for those other branches of the government to implement the reforms and announce compliance with the Peace Accords.

Nonetheless, there are plenty of other reforms the Guatemalan military can affect. As directed in *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society* and in *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, the

Guatemalan military developed a new military doctrine that enhances professionalism, bolsters democratic ideals, and supports military subordination to a civilian authority. The new Guatemalan military doctrine, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala*, relies on several doctrinal principles and values. These principles are the foundation of the new doctrine and many of them support the democratic standard of military subordination to a civilian authority. Some such principles are: the hierarchical organization of the military based on the principles of discipline and obedience within the law; the military's respect for the Guatemalan Constitution; and the military as professional, apolitical, obedient and non-deliberative (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 7-8). These principles show the military's doctrinal acceptance of civilian control under the Guatemalan Constitution and within the law.

Additionally, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* establishes the military chain of command in Part Three, *Guatemalan Military Organization*. This section of the new doctrine confirms that the president is the commander-in-chief of the Guatemalan armed forces (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 25). An elected civilian official, the president is the highest command authority in the Guatemalan military. Next in the chain of command, the minister of defense advises and assists the president, but he is clearly subordinate to the president (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 25). This is in agreement with *Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations*, which calls for the military to be subordinate to a constitutionally elected political power, which emanates from the ballot box through the procedures established by the Constitution.

In order to comply with the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan military also worked to eliminate those organizations that had sustained the Guatemalan military's undue influence over government functions. Required to reorganize the deployment of forces in order to better support the new peacetime roles, the Guatemalan military changed its military zone system by deactivating four military zones (Ejército de Guatemala 1998, 8) and reorganizing into a new regional system (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional 1999, 34). This command structure reorganization also had the effect of relieving military zone commanders of their regional district responsibilities and, therefore, reducing their influence over local government functions.

The Guatemalan military influences national level politics through the Presidential General Staff. The Presidential General Staff also controls the military intelligence network that influences government through information control and intimidation. As a result, the Guatemalan military should abolish the Presidential General Staff in order to become more professional, support democratic ideals, and improve civilian control over the military. In fact, all indications are that the Guatemalan military is ready to deactivate the Presidential General Staff now. However, the Guatemalan government has yet to establish a functional civilian presidential staff to take over the legitimate services the Presidential General Staff provides. For this reason, the president of Guatemala has yet to abolish the Presidential General Staff.

The Guatemalan government made some progress in establishing a civilian controlled national intelligence service. With a national intelligence service, the Guatemalan military now has responsibility and authority to collect intelligence related to military matters only. Consequently, the Presidential General Staff no longer has an

intelligence function. But, the government is still developing a civilian organization to provide necessary staff support for the executive branch. Until that is done, the president is likely to retain the Presidential General Staff. Yet, the continued existence of the Presidential General Staff gives the impression, at least, that the Guatemalan military can still influence government functions and may not yet be truly subordinate to a civilian democratic authority.

Likewise, in order to increase civilian oversight of the military, *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime* directs the amendment of Article 246, *Duties and Powers of the President Over the Armed Forces*, of the Guatemalan Constitution. This amendment effectively removes the requirement for the minister of defense to be an active duty military person. This is meant to strengthen civilian control over the Guatemalan military and emphasize the Guatemalan military's rightful subordination to a civilian democratic authority. However, Guatemala has not been able to make any of the constitutional amendments required by the Peace Accords. Again, the May 1999 referendum on constitutional reforms failed to pass, defeating all fifty-two amendments directed by the Peace Accords. Nevertheless, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala* purposely follows the recommendations of the Peace Accords so that, if the constitutional reforms ever come to pass, the new doctrine will still be valid and will conform to both the Constitution and the Peace Accords. As such, the new military doctrine never indicates whether the minister of defense is a military officer or an appointed civilian. Today, the minister of defense is still a military officer. As with the Presidential General Staff, this reinforces the notion that the Guatemalan military can still influence government functions and may not be sufficiently subordinate to a civilian

democratic authority so as to indicate any increased level of professionalism and support to democracy.

A professional military supports the ideals of democracy, respects human rights, and values service to nation over personal advancement. However, a truly professional military that supports a democracy also recognizes its subordination to a civil authority. With the negotiated peace, the Guatemalan military could now relinquish its control over government functions and reestablish its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. The Guatemalan military did make certain changes to its internal structure that both supported its new peacetime roles and enhanced civilian control over the military. Modifications to the Guatemalan military doctrine and organization structure illustrate the military's acceptance of civilian control. However, the continued existence of the Presidential General Staff and the failure to establish a civilian minister of defense, despite the fact that both cases seem to be out of the control of the military, establishes the possibility that the Guatemalan military may still influence government functions and may not be sufficiently subordinate to a civilian democratic authority. Therefore, the current condition of the Guatemalan military lacks sufficient civilian control within a democracy. Without any definite subordination to a democratic authority, the Guatemalan military's level of professionalism and support to democracy is inadequate.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On 29 December 1996, the Guatemalan government and insurgent representatives signed the thirteenth and final Peace Accord, *Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace*, of the United Nations mediated peace process that brought an end to the country's thirty-six years of civil war (Republic of Guatemala 1996c). During the internal conflict the Guatemalan military fought an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, marked by numerous tactical successes. However, during that campaign, the Guatemalan military, as well as the insurgents, violated the human rights of combatants and noncombatants on a regular basis (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 22). Also, with the country in a state of civil war, the Guatemalan military took over several governmental functions, such as law enforcement and local civil administration (Schirmer 1998, 25).

With the end of hostilities, the Guatemalan military needed to transition from wartime to peacetime. This meant transitioning from counterinsurgency operations inside Guatemala's borders to peacetime operations with an external national defense focus. It also meant relinquishing control over government functions and transitioning to a more professional military under civilian control within a democracy. In fact, several of the Peace Accords, especially the eighth accord, *Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society*, required specific changes to the Guatemalan military structure as part of the peace agreement (Republic of Guatemala 1996a). Later, the Commission for Historical Clarification's

report of conclusions and recommendations, *Guatemala Memory of Silence*, called for additional changes in the Guatemalan military in light of past human rights violations (Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 60-65). In other words, the Guatemalan military had to make a successful transition from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy.

It has now been four years since the final Peace Accord was signed. During that time, a free and fair national election took place in 1999, followed by a smooth transition of power from one civilian government administration to the next. The administration of President Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen of the National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)) oversaw the signing of the last seven United Nations mandated Peace Accords and the first three years of their implementation. In January 2000, the presidency transitioned to Alfonso Portillo Cabrera and his administration from the Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)). They continued to advance the peace process. Both administrations, along with the Guatemalan military leadership, have worked to implement the governmental and military changes directed by the Peace Accords and to address the concerns of the Guatemalan people and the international community. Given these efforts, the four years since the signing of the final Peace Accord is reasonably sufficient time for the Guatemalan military to have at least initiated the specific changes necessary for it to transition from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture.

An evaluation of the Guatemalan military's transition from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy can be divided into two parts. The first part of the transition

concerns the internal structure of the military that dictates how the military will determine its roles and prepare to perform its functions. The second part of the transition relates to the current condition of the military as an indicator of its level of professionalism and support to democracy.

The first part of the transition concerns the internal structure of the military that dictates how the military will determine its roles and prepare to perform its functions. If the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine, organization, and training to reflect its new peacetime role, then it has transitioned from a counterinsurgency war to peace with an external defense focus. In order for this to be true, the following events must occur: The Guatemalan military must change its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions; it must change its organization to support its new role and missions; and it must change its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations.

In December 1999, the Guatemalan military published its new peacetime doctrine, *Doctrina del Ejército de Guatemala*. This new military doctrine is based on an external defense role that is centered on the protection of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. It addresses internal security as an extraordinary and limited function under control of civilian authority. Counterinsurgency is no longer part of the Guatemalan military doctrine. In addition, the new doctrine incorporates appropriate peacetime roles that promote regional stability, combat transnational crime, and provide humanitarian assistance. Clearly, the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions.

Since the signing of the final Peace Accord in 1996, the Guatemalan military reduced its force structure by 33 percent, reorganized into a regional command structure to better support peacetime roles, disbanded the Civil Defense Patrols, demobilized the Mobile Military Police, and relinquished control over national police forces. This reduction in forces and structure reorganization supports the military's new external defense and peacetime functions. The unit deactivations also remove those aspects of the military organization meant to control the civilian population. However, the Guatemalan military has yet to abolish the Presidential General Staff that is unwarranted in a democracy. Ready to do so, but waiting for the formation of a civilian presidential staff, the Guatemalan military must eliminate the Presidential General Staff in order to complete the changes to its organization that are necessary to support its new role and missions.

As part of its new military doctrine, the Guatemalan military developed a new military education system. It introduced new training and professional development programs as part of the new military education system. It also modified the content of existing training programs in order to make them compatible with the new military education system. This included changes to the curriculum for the Escuela Politécnica, the Kiabil school, the intelligence training program, and the civil affairs training program. All of the training formally focused on counterinsurgency is now in accordance with the new military education system, the Peace Accords, and the ideals of human rights. The Guatemalan military's new training system supports the military's new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations.

The second part of the transition relates to the current condition of the military and how it relates to the level of professionalism and support for democratic ideals. If the Guatemalan military has become more professional and supportive of democracy, then it transitioned to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy. In order for this to be true, the following conditions must exist: The Guatemalan military must have a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement; it must support the ideals of democracy and must acknowledge respect for human rights; and it must recognize its subordination to civilian democratic authority.

The Guatemalan military has made an effort to improve officer corps professionalism and remove systems that facilitate personal advancement over service to the nation. The Guatemalan military's new military doctrine and training systems reduce military political influence, increase military professionalism, and reinforce the concept of service to the nation over personal advancement. Even with the continued existence of the promoción and centenario systems, the significant changes to the internal structure of the Guatemalan military still positively influence the professionalism of the Guatemalan officer corps and its promotion of service to the nation over personal advancement. The current conditions that exist in the Guatemalan military allow for a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement.

The Guatemalan military has instituted changes to its internal structure that clearly support the ideals of democracy and respect for human rights. Guatemala's new military doctrine contains new principles and values that compel the Guatemalan military to support the ideals of democracy and respect human rights. The new military education

system institutionalizes these concepts of democracy and respect for human rights throughout the Guatemalan military. Respect for human rights and support for democratic ideals are part of a higher level of professionalism and support to democracy that facilitates a successful transition from war to peace in Guatemala. The current condition of the military indicates that the Guatemalan military supports the ideals of democracy and acknowledges respect for human rights.

Since the declaration of peace, the Guatemalan military has made certain changes that support its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. Modifications to the Guatemalan military doctrine and organizational structure illustrate the military's acceptance of civilian control. However, the continued existence of the Presidential General Staff and the failure to establish a civilian minister of defense, despite the fact that both cases seem to be out of the control of the military, establishes the possibility that the Guatemalan military may still influence government functions and may lack sufficient civilian control within a democracy. As such, the current condition of the military implies that the Guatemalan military still may not recognize its subordination to a civilian democratic authority.

This evaluation of the Guatemalan military's transition from war to peace shows that, while the military has made significant and important changes, there are still a few actions that must occur before the transition is complete. In reference to its internal structure, the Guatemalan military has changed its doctrine from one based on counterinsurgency to one based on an external defense role with suitable missions; it has changed its training system to support its new role and missions, not counterinsurgency operations; and it has changed the majority of its organization to support its new role and

missions. However, as part of necessary changes to its organization, the Guatemalan military has yet to abolish the Presidential General Staff. The transition from counterinsurgency war to peace with an external defense focus still requires deactivation of the Presidential General Staff. In reference to its current condition, the Guatemalan military has a professional officer corps that values service to nation over personal advancement; supports the ideals of democracy and acknowledges a respect for human rights; and indicate that it recognizes its subordination to a civilian democratic authority. However, the existence of the Presidential General Staff and the lack of a civilian minister of defense make it possible for the Guatemalan military to still influence government functions. A sufficient level of professionalism and support to democracy still requires deactivation of the Presidential General Staff and appointment of a civilian minister of defense. Consequently, the Guatemalan military has not yet successfully transitioned from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy.

Then again, the two requirements pending for complete transition from war to peace are not within the control of the Guatemalan military. The Guatemalan military understands the rationale behind the demand to abolish the Presidential General Staff. However, the Guatemalan government has yet to establish a functional civilian presidential staff to take over those legitimate services the Presidential General Staff does provide. For that reason, former President Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen asked the Guatemalan military to retain the Presidential General Staff and current President Alfonso Portillo has yet to abolish the Presidential General Staff. Future research can determine if the Guatemalan military is ever finally allowed to disband the Presidential General Staff.

The Guatemalan military is also ready to accept a civilian minister of defense. However, that requires constitutional changes and legislative changes that are outside the control of the military. In fact, Guatemala has yet to make those constitutional amendments required by the Peace Accords. The legislative branch of the Guatemalan government is responsible for amending the Constitution. It sponsored a nationwide referendum on constitutional reforms recommended by the Peace Accords in May 1999, but the reforms failed to pass. Although the referendum was open and fair, the consolidation of some fifty-two amendments under one yes or no vote caused some confusion and consternation that caused the voters to reject the reform package. Again, future research can determine if and how Guatemala comes to appoint a civilian minister of defense. More encompassing, future research can also investigate the entire problem of constitutional reform. Guatemala has three choices: It can find a way to pass the constitutional reforms recommended by the Peace Accord; it can approve a whole new Constitution that incorporates the reforms of the Peace Accords; or it can find a way to institute the reforms of the Peace Accords without changing the Constitution.

The success of the Guatemalan military's transition from wartime to peacetime greatly affects the well-being of Guatemalans, Guatemala's acceptance in the international community, and the United States' varied interests in Latin America. On 30 March 1998, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA)), an organization established to monitor the implementation of the Peace Accords, released a statement declaring that the provisions of the Peace Accords had been fulfilled (Van Volkenburg n.d., 58). Despite

this, MINUGUA continues to operate in Guatemala, indicating that some Peace Accord requirements may still need monitoring.

Many more government, nongovernment, and private organizations closely monitor Guatemala's effort to transition from wartime to peacetime, to include the United States Embassy in Guatemala. All these groups have vastly different views as to the status of the Guatemalan military's transition. Among these groups with differing opinions are several sections within the United States government and several human rights watch-groups based in the United States. All of them are deeply concerned over the United States' political, economic, and military interests in Guatemala, as well as throughout the rest of Latin America. Unfortunately, many of the differing opinions seem to be based on emotion and political convenience instead of facts and a measurable standard. Many of those opinions are prejudiced by emotions or based on immeasurable subjective criteria. When human rights issues are added, the debate becomes very emotionally charged and politically dangerous.

This Evaluation of the Guatemalan military's transition from war to peace used an objective, disinterested set of criteria developed by the author. Unfortunately, some government and nongovernment organizations that evaluate Guatemala's transition do not use any evaluation criteria or only use subjective criteria that remain undefined. These organizations base crucial decisions that greatly affect Guatemala and the Guatemalan people on their poorly established criteria. Financial aid, market access, and other type of international assistance are based on these organizations' evaluation of Guatemala's transition from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture. This, in turn, affects Guatemala's efforts to maintain a prosperous and peaceful existence. Therefore, it

is unfair to the Guatemalan people for any organization to use anything but objective and disinterested criteria when evaluating Guatemala's transition from war to peace. Future research can determine what type of criteria different government and nongovernment organizations used to evaluate the Guatemalan military's transition from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture.

The evaluation of the Guatemalan military's transition from a wartime counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military also directly affects United States diplomatic and military relations with Guatemala. Currently, Congress prohibits conventional military-to-military relations between the United States and Guatemala. This is based on alleged human rights violations by the Guatemalan military during the war (Van Volkenburg n.d., 56). However, with the new peace, a reexamination of the United States' relationship with Guatemala is in order. Supporting democracy and human rights abroad is part of the United States security strategy and clearly in the nation's interest (U.S. President 1999). Therefore, the United States must determine how it will continue to support Guatemala's transition from war to peace and help the Guatemalan people build a more stable democratic society. The use of this evaluation can help determine where the United States needs to focus its support efforts in order to assist the Guatemalan military in its transition from a counterinsurgency military to a professional peacetime military subordinated to civilian control within a democracy.

Part of that support can be in the way of renewed military-to-military relations, reinstated conventional International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs,

and new Foreign Military Finance (FMF) projects that will support the new peacetime roles, promote professionalism, and encourage institutionalization of the transition.


Some in the United States government may not agree with the objective and disinterested criteria developed and evaluated in this study. However, the point is that an evaluation took place. Anyone may develop and apply different criteria as long as that set of criteria is objective and disinterested. The next step is to apply that set of criteria in order to determine when to lift sanctions and what type of support to provide. In addition, that set of criteria should be published and provided to the Guatemalans. There are a lot of progressive Guatemalan government and military leaders who understand the value of United States assistance. They want to accomplish what is necessary to gain increased financial and military aid from the United States. Providing these leaders with the set of evaluation criteria will help them focus their efforts and will bring about a more rapid and successful transition from war to peace. Future research may determine why some government agencies may not have a complete set of objective and disinterested criteria for evaluating the Guatemalan military's transition from a wartime posture to a peacetime posture. Future research can also help determine differences in evaluation criteria between government agencies in order to better articulate one single set of criteria for the United States in reference to the Guatemalan military's transition from war to peace.

Also, the questions as to whether a country's military has successfully transitioned from a counterinsurgency role to a peacetime role or whether a country's military has become sufficiently professional will continue to arise and affect United States diplomatic and military relations around the world. The evaluation in this study

can be the basis for the development of a model or standard against which military transition and professionalism can be measured. Such a model or standard can significantly assist both the United States Department of State and United States Department of Defense in evaluating diplomatic and military relations with foreign countries and producing objective, consistent policy recommendations for political and military leaders.


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Authorized Strength of Guatemalan Military: 46,900

Figure 1: Wartime Organization of the Guatemalan Military (as of 1996)
(Schirmer 1998, 174)



Authorized Strength of Guatemalan Military: 31,423

Figure 2: Peacetime Organization of the Guatemalan Military (as of 2000)
(Ministerio De La Defensa Nacional 1999, 60)

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